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 Written in the burgeoning tradition of Aristotelian liberalism, my thesis seeks to 
enrich this tradition by developing a liberal theory of autonomy based on a broadly 
Aristotelian foundation. Chapter One summarizes and critiques the major contemporary 
theories of autonomy developed by Kant and analytic philosophers. Chapter Two 
explicates the Aristotelian conception of autonomy, drawing on recent work by Fred 
Miller and Roderick Long. Aristotle is chided for not being liberal enough and so Chapter 
Three develops an Aristotelian-liberal theory of autonomy based in part on recent work 
by Douglas Rasmussen, Douglas Den Uyl and Roderick Long. Global and local 
individual autonomy are distinguished, with global autonomy being the exercise of one's 
rational faculty (or self-direction) and local autonomy relating to particular desires, 
preferences, actions, and so forth. Local autonomy is further conceived as having three 
fundamental dimensions: political, social, and personal. Political autonomy equates with 
the traditional classical liberal/libertarian concept of liberty, and is normatively protected 
by the right to liberty. Social autonomy involves freedom from social influences other 
than the threat or use of physical force that lead a person to deviate from his telos. 
Personal autonomy involves internal freedom from deviant desires, severe addiction to 
drugs, and so forth that lead a person to deviate from his telos. Personal and social 
autonomy cannot be promoted at the systematic expense of political autonomy. 
Aristotelian liberalism, and an Aristotelian-liberal theory of autonomy, promise to 
transcend the liberal/communitarian debate. An Aristotelian-liberal theory of autonomy 




 Autonomy is an important concept in Kantian moral philosophy, contemporary 
analytic and moral philosophy, the political philosophy of liberalism, and the 
contemporary liberal/communitarian debate. It is often argued by proponents and critics 
alike that autonomy is of fundamental importance to moral agency and/or to liberalism.1 
And communitarian critics of autonomy and liberalism charge the concept of autonomy 
with being atomistic, asocial, ahistorical, and presupposing a radically free self. The 
dominant theories of autonomy outside of liberalism seem to be those in the Kantian and 
analytic traditions. Both sets of theories are deficient not only from the communitarian 
perspective but also from the point of view of Aristotelian and neo-Aristotelian 
philosophy. 
 Many communitarians hearken back to Aristotle for inspiration and support, but a 
growing number of liberals are arguing that a broadly Aristotelian philosophy provides a 
better foundation for liberalism than those of the Enlightenment.2 An Aristotelian 
liberalism promises to transcend the liberal/communitarian debate as well as to provide a 
conception of autonomy that is not vulnerable to the familiar communitarian critique.  
 
                                                 
1 At least one scholar has argued that autonomy is not required for moral responsibility, however; see 
Kekes (1998). 
2 I mean, of course, liberal in the classical or libertarian sense. My approach is an Aristotelian-liberal 
synthesis. Obviously, despite some definite liberal tendencies, Aristotle was no liberal; nor was he fully 
a communitarian, however. Aristotelian liberals, on the other hand, recognize a greater degree of 
pluralism and demand a larger scope for individual autonomy. For the roots of liberal individualism and 
natural law and natural rights theory in Aristotle, see Fred D. Miller, Jr. (1995); and for a necessary 
amendment to it, see Long (1996). Also, on the ontological and moral priority of the individual in 
Aristotle's thought, see Zeller (1897), Machan (1998), and Khawaja (1999, 2000). On Aristotelian 
liberalism in general, see Rasmussen and Den Uyl (1991, 1997, 2005), Den Uyl and Rasmussen (1981), 
Rasmussen (1980), Den Uyl (1991), Rand (1964, 1966), Long (1994/95, 2000, 2001, 2002), Sciabarra 
(1995, 2000, 2005), Khawaja (1999, 2000). 
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However, autonomy is not commonly thought of in connection with Aristotle, nor is the 
great philosopher commonly thought of as a predecessor of or friendly to liberalism. 
 In chapter one, I will briefly discuss the Kantian and major analytic theories of 
autonomy, then offer some criticisms of these. In chapter two, I will explicate the 
Aristotelian conception of autonomy, employing textual exegesis and drawing on the 
more thorough work of Fred Miller and Roderick Long. Finally, in chapter three, I will 
develop an Aristotelian-liberal conception of autonomy influenced by the work of 
Douglas Rasmussen, Douglas Den Uyl, Roderick Long, Fred Miller, and Chris Matthew 
Sciabarra. In so doing, I will argue for conceptual distinctions, but not separations!, 
between global and local autonomy on the one hand and on the other hand between three 
fundamental dimensions of local individual autonomy (political, social, and personal), 












I. Major Contemporary Theories of Autonomy 
 The dominant theories of autonomy in analytic philosophy received their 
inspiration, but are now very different, from Kant's conception of autonomy. Before 
turning to these analytic theories it will be useful by way of contrast to briefly explicate 
Kantian autonomy and why analytic philosophers have developed an alternative to it. I 
will here be following the interpretation of Thomas Hill in his essay “The Kantian 
Conception of Autonomy.”3 For Kant, autonomy has both positive and negative 
dimensions. Before discussing these dimensions, it is important to point out a faux-
Kantian view of autonomy that is sometimes attributed to him.  
 According to Hill, this faux-view is that when one acts from inclination or desire 
then the act is causally determined by desire, unfree, and heteronomous; but when one 
acts from moral principle, namely a moral law willed on oneself, then the act is “causally 
undetermined choice, free, and perfectly rational” – i.e., autonomous.4 This view has the 
absurd consequence of holding all immoral acts to be unfree or heteronomous and all 
moral acts as being free or autonomous. Moreover, “since Kant argues both that negative 
freedom is inseparable from autonomy and that it is a necessary condition of moral 
obligation, we would have to conclude that whenever one lacks autonomy one is not 
under moral obligation. Thus the apparently immoral thief, acting from greed, is not 
merely excused from responsibility; he was not even acting contrary to a moral 
obligation.”5 In any case, it is not a view properly attributable to Kant. 
 
                                                 
3 Hill in Christman (1989), pp. 91-105. 
4 Ibid., p. 95. 
5 Ibid. 
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 Hill argues that for Kant autonomy is a property of human wills. Kant says that to 
have a will is to have “the power to act in accordance with [one's] idea of laws...[or] 
principles” or “a kind of causality belonging to living things so far as they are rational.”6  
Hill argues that Kant viewed autonomy as a property of virtually all normal adult human 
beings and not merely a special feature of the few who manage to be perfectly rational 
and moral. Any will with autonomy is necessarily “free in a negative sense,” which 
means “the property [the will] has of being able to work independently of alien causes.”7  
This negative freedom is a necessary condition for moral agency. Rational agents can 
have reasons not based on their desires, but Kant argues that we must think of them as 
having reasons for their actions. Wills with autonomy are free but not lawless, they do 
not engage in some sort of Sartrean “radical choice”8  
 Kant also says that autonomy is freedom “positively conceived,” which means 
that a will has the property of being “a law unto itself...independently of every property 
belonging to the objects of volition.”9 Autonomy implies the obligation to be rational and 
moral. Hill summarizes what he sees as the main features of this idea of positive freedom 
thusly: 
To conceive a person as having positive freedom is to think of the person 
as having, (1) in addition to negative freedom, (2) a deep rational 
commitment to some principle(s) of conduct as (rationally) binding but (3) 
not adopted for the sake of satisfying desires, (4) not just prescribing 
means to rationally contingent ends, and yet (5) in some sense necessarily 
imposed on oneself by oneself as a rational agent. Further, though one 
may not always live up to it, (6) the commitment is seen by the agent as 
rationally overriding other sorts of principles and aims, in case of conflict. 
                                                 
6 Kant (1964), pp. 80 & 114, respectively.  
7 Ibid., p. 114. 
8 Hill in Christman (1989), p. 100. 
9 Kant (1964), p. 108; see also p. 114 . 
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Finally, setting aside cognitive requirements and formal principles such as 
“Take the means or abandon the end,” the only action-guiding principles 
that are rationally “authoritative” for the agent with autonomy are 
principles that satisfy these conditions, and so (7) no principle to which 
one is committed because of contingent features of one's human or 
individual make-up has this sort of necessary reason-giving force.10 
 
 The Kantian conception of autonomy has been rejected in analytic philosophy for 
a number of reasons. First, it lacks an empirically testable referent. Second, it seems to 
entail acceptance of questionable metaphysical and epistemological doctrines (although 
Hill argues against the former). Third, it seems to entail commitment to certain moral 
values and principles (something Hill also seems to dispute11), while analytic 
philosophers seem increasingly to be striving for a theory of autonomy that is content-
neutral with regard to morality. Now, the Kantian conception of autonomy has problems 
from the Aristotelian point of view as well, but not necessarily the same as those 
identified by analytic philosophers. Indeed, there is much in Kant with which 
Aristotelians can disagree, particularly his separation of reason and morality from desire 
and emotion, from man's animal nature, from the contingent and the particular and from 
specific contexts and circumstances. On the other hand, to provide one criticism of 
analytic theories in advance, an Aristotelian conception of autonomy, like the Kantian 
conception, would not be entirely content-neutral, separating autonomy from a particular 
moral theory. Just why this is not incompatible with liberalism's commitment to 
pluralism, as is often thought, will be touched upon in chapter three. Communitarians 
often take issue with Kant's notion of a transcendental self that is free from alien causes; 
such a conception of the self, or something like it, is thought to underlie the liberal notion 
                                                 
10 Hill in Christman (1989), pp. 89-99. 
11 See ibid., pp. 99 & 101. 
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of autonomy. As will be seen in chapters two and three, however, an Aristotelian-liberal 
conception of autonomy can avoid this problem of relying upon a radically free self.  
 The most influential account of autonomy in analytic philosophy is the desire-
based hierarchical model, which has also been called the Dworkin-Frankfurt (DF) model. 
Theories of autonomy based on this model posit a split-level self in which human beings 
are distinctively characterized by their ability to critically assess their first-order desires 
and endorse or repudiate them with second-order desires. According to this account, as 
James Stacey Taylor relates: “A person is autonomous with respect to a first-order desire 
that moves her to act (e.g., she wants to smoke, and so she smokes) if she endorses her 
possession of that first-order desire (e.g., she wants to want to smoke).”12 On the other 
hand, if she does not endorse her first-order desire (e.g., she wants not to want to smoke), 
then she is not autonomous, she is heteronomous, with respect to her first-order desire. 
Taylor argues that this hierarchical approach has three major advantages: 1) it fits our 
intuitions about persons, 2) it is explicitly naturalistic and compatibilist, and 3) it is 
content neutral - “for it does not require persons to hold any particular values in order for 
them to be autonomous.”13 
 The hierarchical theories of Harry Frankfurt and Gerald Dworkin have important 
differences, so it will be useful to examine them separately. Frankfurt's theory has been 
the more influential of the two. In Frankfurt's original theory, a person is autonomous 
                                                 
12 Taylor (2005), “Introduction,” p. 1. The remainder of this chapter is heavily indebted to Taylor's 
scholarly introduction to his anthology Personal Autonomy (2005) as well as to his older review essay, 
“The Theory of Autonomy” (1999). 
13 Ibid., p. 2. As I will argue in chapter three, the lack of such content-neutrality is not necessarily a 
problem. 
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with respect to an effective first-order desire if he volitionally endorses that desire.14 A 
first-order desire is a desire that a particular state of affairs obtains. An effective first-
order desire is a desire that moves one to act. A first-order desire is volitionally endorsed 
if one has a second-order desire to have that particular first-order desire and also wants 
that first-order desire to move him to act. 
 In Dworkin's original theory, “an autonomous person is one who does his own 
thing,” that is, when “the attitude that [the] person takes towards the influences 
motivating him...determines whether or not they are to be considered 'his'.”15 Authenticity 
and autonomy seem here to be conflated. A person's motivations are authentic (or 
autonomous) if he endorses (or identifies with) being moved by the first-order desires he 
has. But actually, Dworkin writes that “autonomy = authenticity + independence.”16 In 
addition to authenticity, Dworkin posits two other requirements for autonomy: procedural 
and substantive independence. As Taylor pithily relates: “A person possesses procedural 
independence with respect to her motivations if her desire to be moved to act by them has 
not been produced by 'manipulation, deception, the withholding of relevant information, 
and so on'. A person possesses substantive independence with respect to his motivations 
if he does not 'renounce his independence of thought or action' prior to developing 
them.”17 
 While intuitively plausible, hierarchical theories of autonomy are vulnerable to 
three serious objections or problems. These are the Problem of Manipulation, the 
                                                 
14 See Frankfurt's “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person” in Christman (1989), pp. 63-76 and 
in Frankfurt (1988), pp. 11-25. 
15 Dworkin (1976), “Autonomy and Behavior Control,” pp. 26-27. 
16 Ibid., p. 24. 
17 Taylor (2005), “Introduction,” p. 4. The passages cited by Taylor are from Dworkin (1976), pp. 26-27. 
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Regress-cum-Incompleteness Problem, and the Ab Initio Problem/Problem of 
Authority.18  As will be seen, these problems are interrelated. The most serious of these 
appears to be the Problem of Manipulation. Frankfurt's theory in particular is vulnerable 
to it, because his theory is an “ahistorical (or structural, punctuate, or time slice) account 
of autonomy.”19 Consider that in Frankfurt's original theory, a person is autonomous with 
respect to his effective first-order desires regardless of their historical origins so long as 
he volitionally endorses them. Frankfurt is committed to holding a person to be 
autonomous even if his first-order desire and his second-order desire to have the first-
order desire were both inculcated in him by means of brainwashing, hypnotism, or some 
other form of trickery or coercion. So long as a person volitionally endorses his effective 
first-order desire, whatever it may be and however he came to so endorse it, he is 
considered autonomous in Frankfurt's theory. 
 Taylor contends that because of his procedural independence and substantive 
independence requirements, Dworkin's theory of autonomy is not directly subject to the 
Problem of Manipulation. However, Taylor launches an indirect challenge to Dworkin's 
theory by arguing that Dworkin “simply rul[es] ex cathedra that a person is not 
autonomous with respect to those desires that he has been manipulated into possessing.”20  
In order to provide a theoretically satisfactory account of autonomy, Dworkin needs to 
explain “why a person's autonomy would be thus undermined, so that influences on a 
                                                 
18 For a more thorough and nuanced account of these three problems, and as a general introduction to the 
major analytic theories of autonomy, see the introduction in Taylor (2005). See also, Taylor (1999) and 
the introductions in Christman (1989) and Christman and Anderson (2005). Then, consult the essays 
collected within the edited volumes cited herein. 
19 Taylor (2005), “Introduction,” p. 5. 
20 Ibid. 
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person's behavior that do not seem to undermine her autonomy (e.g., advice) can be 
differentiated from those that do (e.g., deception).”21 To extend Taylor's argument, it is 
not clear how Dworkin would handle the issue of education, particularly of children. 
What is it, if anything, that makes the education of children different from “manipulation, 
deception, the withholding of relevant information, and so on”?22 Can children be 
autonomous? If yes, does education or certain forms of it violate procedural 
independence? And if not, at what point in human development do procedural and 
substantive independence become relevant criteria, at what point do developing human 
beings become autonomous? Following this line of reasoning, one might wonder whether 
or at what point a person raised to have certain beliefs and behave in certain ways 
(whether rightly or wrongly, as all children are by involved parents) did not “renounce 
his independence of thought or action”23 (i.e., substantive independence) prior to being 
educated by his parents and others. This last is suggestive of the Ab Initio 
Problem/Problem of Authority discussed below. Unless Dworkin can somehow account 
for childhood development and education, it would appear his original theory avoids the 
Problem of Manipulation only at the cost of implausible and counterintuitive implications 
– that children are autonomous ab initio24 or become autonomous through a non-
autonomous process25 or that education is manipulation, deception and so forth. 
 
                                                 
21 Ibid., p. 6. 
22 Dworkin (1976), pp. 26-27. 
23 Ibid. 
24 A play on words, ab initio meaning “from the beginning,” and not to be confused with the related Ab 
Initio Problem. 
25 The Ab Initio Problem; see below. This problem seems significant for desire-based hierarchical theories 
of autonomy, but may not be so for other kinds of theories such as the Aristotelian and Aristotelian-
liberal theories discussed in chapters two and three. 
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 The Regress-cum-Incompleteness Problem is twofold. The very nature of 
hierarchical theories threatens an infinite regress, and requires a theoretically satisfactory 
explanation for any claim that such a regress will not occur. If, as these theories claim, a 
person is autonomous with respect to his effective first-order desires if he volitionally 
endorses them with a second-order desire, the question then arises as to whether he is 
autonomous with respect to his second-order desires. That autonomy requires effective 
first-order desires to be volitionally endorsed by second-order desires implies that an 
even higher, third-order, desire is required to endorse the second-order desires. And this, 
of course, implies that an even higher, fourth-order, desire is required, and so on, ad 
infinitum. In order to head off this regress, it must be claimed that a person is indeed 
autonomous with regard to his second-order desires without the need for endorsing third-
order desires; but if this is so, a further question arises as to why; Frankfurt's and 
Dworkin's theories are thus incomplete. Yet another question arises, however, and this is 
the question of why autonomy requires that effective first-order desires be endorsed by 
second-order desires in the first place if second-order desires do not need to be so 
endorsed by higher order desires in turn. Thus, the need for a hierarchical model is itself 
put in question. 
 An alternative way out of the Regress-cum-Incompleteness Problem is open to 
Frankfurt and Dworkin, but it leads directly into the third problem: the Ab Initio 
Problem/Problem of Authority. Frankfurt and Dworkin, perhaps wisely, do not take this 
path, but it is important to examine it in any case. Hierarchical theories like those of 
Frankfurt and Dworkin may yet be trapped by it, as the issue of childhood education 
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raised above with regards to Dworkin's theory suggests. As Taylor points out, “the 
proponents of the hierarchical approach could avoid the Regress-cum-Incompleteness 
Problem simply by claiming that although the person in question is not autonomous with 
respect to her higher-order endorsing desire, she is autonomous with respect to her 
endorsed first-order desire, because autonomy is simply constituted by such an 
endorsement.”26 Aside from the problem of appearing to be another ex cathedra claim 
like Dworkin's discussed above, this move leads directly to the Ab Initio Problem: “How 
can a person become autonomous with respect to a desire through a process with respect 
to which she was not autonomous?”27 
 When put in the following manner, the Ab Initio Problem is often termed the 
Problem of Authority: “how is it that a person's higher-order desires possess any 
authority over her lower-order desires?”28 In other words, as Gary Watson has pithily and 
aptly pointed out: “Since second-order volitions are themselves simply desires, to add 
them to the context of conflict is just to increase the number of contenders; it is not to 
give a special place to any of those in contention.”29 This again calls into question the 
very need for and validity of the hierarchical model. Why should we accept the ontology 
of the split-level self as it is presented, that is, as involving levels of desires? 
 To make a first cut at answering this last question, as Watson's statement suggests, 
I have thus far found no compelling reason to view second-order desires as having any 
special place or authority over that of first-order desires, in any theory of autonomy and 
                                                 
26 Taylor (2005), “Introduction,” p.  6. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Watson (1975), p. 218. 
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in general. It seems just as reasonable to me, if not more so, to see the first- and second-
order desires (e.g. the desire to smoke and the desire not to desire to smoke, respectively) 
simply as competing desires, one of which will be revealed in action as a person's 
demonstrated preference. Who is to say which desire is better or correct? It might just as  
well be the first-order desire as the second that is the better to act on, the one more 
autonomous or truer to one's 'self'.  
 Second, it is not clear to me that people even have second-order desires rather 
than just competing desires. The hierarchical model presented thus far seems to impose a 
false structure on the natural operations of the mind. It seems problematic at best to base 
an entire theory of autonomy on the way people sometimes colloquially speak. Rather, it 
seems more natural to see desires and desiring in the following light: it is possible and 
quite common to have two competing desires (e.g., the desire to smoke and the desire not 
to smoke, as opposed to the above hierarchical model of the desire to smoke and the 
desire not to desire to smoke). What normal human beings do seem to have is a second-
order capacity for critical reflection (rationality). One might have these two competing 
desires and, upon critical reflection, endorse one and reject the other; or one might form 
one of these desires as a result of critical reflection and thereby endorse it, while the other 
desire has another source. Three things follow from this: 1) one part of the person wants 
to smoke and another part does not want to smoke, but this does not necessarily entail a 
second-order desire about either want; 2) the mere fact that one of these desires has been 
endorsed and the other rejected does not mean that one is autonomous if one then acts on 
the endorsed desire rather than on the rejected desire; 3) even if a desire if formed as a 
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result of critical reflection, acting on this desire is not enough to establish one's 
autonomy. People can mistakenly endorse the wrong desires, desires that are not theirs in 
either or both of the following senses: 1) the desire is the result of 'illegitimate' external  
influences, 2) the desire is not representative of one's true 'self' – however 'illegitimate' 
and 'self' are conceived. 
 It turns out that Dworkin intended his hierarchical theory of autonomy to be 
something like the preliminary sketch given in the previous paragraph. In later work he 
clarified his account. This clarification hinges upon a distinction between local and global 
conceptions of autonomy. A local conception of autonomy involves the conditions that 
must be met for a person to be autonomous with respect to his desires or actions. 
Frankfurt's theory, and Dworkin's as it was for a time interpreted, as well as the 
alternative account sketched in the previous paragraph, represent local conceptions of 
autonomy. Instead, Dworkin clarified that his theory is really a global conception in 
which autonomy is a “second-order capacity of persons to reflect critically upon their 
first-order preferences, desires, wishes, and so forth.”30 The similarity between the 
account sketched in the previous paragraph and what we now know to be Dworkin's 
actual theory is the importance of the second-order capacity for critical reflection, but it is 
in the exercise of this capacity that Dworkin locates autonomy rather than in a person's 
relation to his particular desires and actions. Contrary to Dworkin, I am inclined to 
conceive of the exercise of this capacity as self-direction, which in turn is a constitutive 
part of autonomy. More will be said on this in chapter three, but first more remains to be 
said about the major analytic theories of autonomy.  
                                                 
30 Dworkin (1988), p. 20. 
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 Dworkin argued that his theory, properly understood, avoids the Regress-cum-
Incompleteness Problem and the Ab Initio Problem/Problem of Authority. It avoids the 
former because what matters is that a person enjoy procedural independence with respect 
to his reflection upon his desires, not whether “preferences at the second order would 
themselves be valued or preferred at a higher level,”31 and it avoids the latter because 
autonomy just is the exercise of the capacity of critical reflection. Dworkin's theory still 
seems vulnerable to the childhood education issue, however, for it is still unclear when a 
human being becomes autonomous and what exactly counts as manipulation, deception, 
and so forth. 
 Finally, Taylor criticizes Dworkin's theory on other grounds, viz., that Dworkin's 
theory, properly understood, “is no longer offering an analysis of autonomy that is 
congruent with the discussions in moral philosophy in which autonomy plays a major 
role, for these discussions focus on the more localized question of what makes a person 
autonomous with respect to her particular desires or her particular actions.”32 The 
distinction between self-direction and autonomy might help solve this deficiency. This 
distinction will also make unnecessary John Kekes's effort to demonstrate that moral 
responsibility does not depend upon autonomy, for it is on self-direction that I hang 
moral agency and thus much of moral responsibility, and not on local autonomy.33 On the 
other hand, if moral philosophers insist on resting moral agency and moral responsibility 
on local autonomy rather than self-direction, and if resting them on self-direction instead 
turns out to be mistaken, then Kekes's effort may indeed be necessary to avoid the 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 Taylor (2005), “Introduction,” p. 8. 
33 See Kekes (1998). 
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problem of rampant heteronomy absolving people of moral responsibility. Again, more 
will be said on this distinction between self-direction and local autonomy in chapter 
three. 
 Although I have already criticized Frankfurt's theory (and theories like it) on more 
fundamental grounds than the three Problems, it is still worth noting the ways in which 
Frankfurt attempted to avoid them. First, in “Identification and Wholeheartedness,” 
Frankfurt attempted to avoid the Regress-cum-Incompleteness Problem by modifying his 
theory with a decision-based element such that “a person is autonomous with respect to 
his effective first-order desire if he decisively endorses it with a second-order volition.”34 
He claimed that any possible regress would be terminated if a person endorsed his 
effective first-order desire “without reservation...in the belief that no further accurate 
inquiry would require him to change his mind.”35 This version of Frankfurt's theory still 
fails to avoid all three Problems, however; the regress problem in particular it fails to 
avoid because the question of whether a person is autonomous with respect to his 
decision still arises. Frankfurt then made a further satisfaction-based modification to his 
theory in “The Faintest Passion.” Attempting to avoid endorsement qua 'deliberate 
psychic event', which brings on the regress, he posits instead a sort of endorsement qua 
passive acceptance or satisfaction. Active reflective endorsement as an event is no longer 
required. Instead, a person merely needs to have “no interest in making changes” in his 
desires.36 This allows him to avoid the regress problem. Frankfurt further argues that the 
passive acceptance or satisfaction has no normative authority but is rather merely 
                                                 
34 Ibid., p. 7. 
35 Frankfurt (1988), pp. 168-169. 
36 Frankfurt (1999), pp. 104-105. 
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descriptive of whether or not a person's desires are his. This apparently immunizes 
Frankfurt's theory to the Ab Initio Problem/Problem of Authority. One problem with 
Frankfurt's new theory has been pointed out by Michael Bratman, who argues that the 
mere failure to reject one's desires does not constitute endorsement of or identification 
with them.37 Moreover, the passive acceptance or satisfaction element of Frankfurt's new 
theory seems to have a highly problematic implication, viz., that the more unreflective 
one is, the more autonomous one is. Finally, Frankfurt's new theory is still undermined by 
the Problem of Manipulation. 
 In “Autonomy and Personal History” and “Defending Historical Autonomy,” 
John Christman incorporates a historical dimension into the hierarchical model of 
autonomy. According to Christman's theory, a person P is autonomous with respect to a 
desire at time t if and only if 
i. P did not resist the development of D (prior to t) when attending to this 
process of development, or P would not have resisted that development 
had P attended to the process; 
 
ii. The lack of resistance to the development of D (prior to t) did not take 
place (or would not have) under the influence of factors that inhibit self-
reflection; 
 
iii. The self-reflection involved in condition i is (minimally) rational and 
involves no self-deception;38 
 
iv. The agent is minimally rational with respect to D at t (where minimal 
rationality demands that an agent experience no manifest conflicts of 
desires or beliefs that significantly affect the agent's behavior and that are 
not subsumed under some otherwise rational plan of action).39 
 
                                                 
37 See Bratman (1996). 
38 Christman (1993), p. 288. See also, Christman (1991), p. 11 and Taylor (2005), “Introduction,” p. 10. 
39 Ibid., p. 288. This fourth condition was added in Christman (1993). See also, Taylor (2005), 
“Introduction,” p. 10. 
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However, Taylor argues that Christman's theory “fails to provide either necessary or 
sufficient conditions for a person to be autonomous with respect to her desires.”40 It fails 
to provide the necessary conditions because a person can become autonomous with 
respect to a desire that he acquired through a non-autonomous process if he endorses the 
desire while nevertheless repudiating the manner in which he came to have it. Taylor 
gives the example of a child coming to love playing piano despite his mother's tyrannical 
means of forcing him to learn. Christman's theory fails to provide the sufficient 
conditions for autonomy because someone plainly heteronomous, such as a person who 
had voluntarily subordinated himself to the arbitrary dominion of another, would still be 
counted as autonomous on Christman's theory due to the fact that he was autonomous 
with respect to his desire to subordinate himself when he entered into the relationship.  
 The aforementioned Michael Bratman has developed a new reasons-based theory 
of autonomy which builds on Frankfurt's satisfaction-based theory and includes a broadly 
Lockean account of personal identity. A person's personal identity is constituted by his 
standing decisions, intentions, and policies. To be autonomous with respect to one's 
desires, one must decide to treat them as reason-giving (i.e., end-setting) in a given 
context and one must also be satisfied with them in the sense of not having reached and 
retained any conflicting decisions, intentions, or policies as also reason-giving. Bratman's 
theory appears to avoid the Ab Initio Problem/Problem of Authority and the Regress-
cum-Incompleteness Problem. It avoids the former because the decisions, intentions, and 
policies are authoritative due to being constitutive of one's self and it avoids the latter 
because the question of whether one is autonomous with respect to them does not arise. 
                                                 
40 Taylor (2005), “Introduction,” p. 10 
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Bratman's theory, however, is still vulnerable to the Problem of Manipulation because a 
person's self, defined as one's standing decisions and so forth, can be manipulated, 
constructed, or reconstructed in the ways previously described (including, perhaps, 
childhood education/socialization/manipulation). 
 That the childhood education/socialization/manipulation issue and the Problem of 
Manipulation appear to be problematic for all of the major analytic theories discussed so 
far is indicative of the central complaint of communitarians about liberalism and 
autonomy: namely, that they seem to be explictly or implicitly based on and/or produce 
atomistic, ahistorical, asocial, radically free selves. Such a notion of a transcendental, 
unencumbered, or radically free self is suggested by this statement of Taylor's: “my 
desire to shout was not 'really mine' – it wasn't one that I endorsed, or identified with – 
but, instead, was just a desire that occurred within me, and which I was subject to.”41 
Consider, also, another statement by Taylor: 
For example, while sitting in my seat at the local cinema I am – and 
entirely unbeknownst to me – subject to repeated images of delicious 
popcorn covered in lovely warm, fresh, salty butter. Such images have 
been designed by unscrupulous popcorn salesmen to instill in me a desire 
for buttered popcorn, and to make me decide to treat such a desire as being 
reason-giving when the interval comes around, and to be satisfied with this 
decision. When the interval comes, then, I – and everyone else in the 
cinema – gets up, and goes off to buy buttered popcorn from the foyer. 
Now, although this inculcated desire does meet the conditions of 
autonomy outlined above, it seems mistaken to claim that this desire for 
popcorn is truly autonomous.42 
 
The “unbeknownst to me” apparently refers to subliminal advertising but, although I 
wonder how effective subliminal advertising really is, in the next paragraph Taylor 
                                                 
41 Taylor (1999), p. 9. Emphasis mine. 
42 Ibid., p. 10. 
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includes normal advertising as well. He also cites 'certain forms of socialization' and 
political campaigning. If such normal social phenomena as these are enough to 
compromise autonomy, then the conception of autonomy being employed here seems 
implicitly to be one in which any external influence that is not first endorsed by the self is 
alien to the self but this implies a fully developed radically free self apart from social 
influences. It also seems to me mistaken to claim that such 'inculcated' desires are not 
truly autonomous. Wherever a particular desire happens to come from, what seems 
important is whether or not the choice to act (or not) upon the desire is volitional or self-
directed. In addition to self-direction, local autonomy must depend upon conditions other 
than simply the ultimate point of origin of one's desires. 
 Finally, an important new account of autonomy worth noting is the coherentist 
theory of Laura Waddell Ekstrom. Instead of desires simpliciter, Ekstrom builds her 
theory on preferences. She conceives of a preference as a species of desire, “a very 
particular sort of desire: it is one (i) for a certain first-order desire to be effective in 
action, when or if one acts, and (ii) that is formed in the search for what is good.”43 
Structurally, then, Ekstrom's preferences are similar to Frankfurt's second-order desires 
and thus appear to be equally subject to the criticism leveled above at the first-order 
desire/second-order desire distinction. Leaving this criticism aside, Ekstrom also 
distinguishes between a person's 'self' and his 'true or most central self'. A person's self 
consists of his character, where his character is constituted by his preferences and the set 
of preferences he accepts at a given time, and his power for “fashioning and 
                                                 
43 Ekstrom (1993), p. 603. See also her essay in Taylor (2005). 
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refashioning” his character.44 The true or more central self is constituted by those subset 
of preferences that actually cohere (i.e., do not conflict). A person is autonomous with 
respect to his preferences if they are part of his true self. For familiar reasons, Ekstrom's 
theory avoids the Regress-cum-Incompleteness Problem and the Ab Initio 
Problem/Problem of Authority. Her theory also seems to avoid the Problem of 
Manipulation; however, it does so only at the problematic cost of holding that any 
manipulation of one's core preferences results not in a loss of autonomy but rather in a 
new person. Additionally, from an Aristotelian eudaimonist perspective, Ekstrom's theory 
is deficient in that it holds whatever cohering preferences one happens to have as one's 
'true self' whereas these may be entirely out of step with one's natural end and therefore 
not representative of one's true self in the teleological sense. Finally, Taylor points out 
that Ekstrom's theory fails to provide a sufficient condition for autonomy because 
someone plainly heteronomous, such as a person who had voluntarily subordinated 
himself to the arbitrary dominion of another, would still be counted as autonomous on her 
theory on account of the servant's cohering preferences constituting his 'true self' despite 






                                                 
44 Ibid., p. 606. 
45 Taylor (2005), “Introduction,” pp. 15-16. 
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II. Aristotelian Autonomy 
 In recent decades communitarians like Alasdair MacIntyre have hearkened back 
to Aristotle for support in their repudiation of modern liberalism. Also recently, a 
growing number of liberals are turning back to Aristotle in search of a better grounding 
for liberalism than the Enlightenment. Aristotle was by no means a liberal, but nor was he 
unequivocally a communitarian; rather, Aristotle seems to have had both liberal and 
communitarian tendencies. In “Aristotle's Conception of Freedom,” written as an 
amendment to Fred Miller's Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle's Politics, Roderick 
Long identifies seven theses that Miller persuasively argues can be attributed non-
anachronistically to Aristotle's political thought, theses which establish his affinity with 
modern liberalism. The theses are: 
1) individuals have rights; 
 
2) these rights are natural, not merely legal or conventional;46 
 
3) these rights forbid any sacrifice of the individual's interests to the 
interests of the community; 
 
4) the state has an obligation to respect and protect these rights; 
 
5) in order to secure these rights, the state's constitutional structure 
should be arranged so as to provide checks on governmental power; 
 
6) legitimate political authority rests on the consent of the governed; and 
 
7) a government that fails to respect the rights of its citizens may 
legitimately be overthrown.47 
 
Long, however, argues that Miller could have gone farther, that Miller made four 
                                                 
46 Natural in the sense of being based on natural justice, not as of being possessed in a state of nature. 
47 Long (1996), p. 776. 
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concessions to communitarian interpretations of Aristotle which he did not have to make. 
These are: 
Concession One: Aristotle, unlike the modern liberal, countenances no 
right to do wrong. 
 
Concession Two: Aristotle, unlike most liberal natural-rights theorists, 
recognizes no rights existing in a prepolitical “state of nature.”48 
 
Concession Three: Aristotle, unlike the modern liberal, regards liberty as 
having only an instrumental and peripheral value. 
 
Concession Four: Aristotle, unlike the modern liberal, assigns no central 
place to autonomy in his conception of rights.49 
 
Long then goes on to provide arguments and textual evidence that these concessions need 
not be made. More recently, Miller has provided a textual exegesis of “Aristotelian 
Autonomy” (2002). I cannot do the full range of their arguments justice here, nor do I 
need to do so. Instead, I will do my best to reconstruct the main points of their arguments 
that relate to autonomy in the limited space available. For more detailed and nuanced 
accounts, the reader should consult the aforementioned works by Miller and Long. 
 In “Aristotelian Autonomy,” Miller discusses what he calls individual autonomy 
and political autonomy. Miller's individual autonomy corresponds roughly to what has in 
the mainstream literature come to be called personal autonomy. Miller's political 
autonomy is a form of group (as opposed to individual) autonomy: political self-rule 
under law (politikh& a)rxh&).50 In Aristotle's political thought these two types of 
                                                 
48 In part, Long argues that Aristotle recognizes some prepolitical2 rights (pre- in the sense of being prior 
in generation (or temporally)), but not prepolitical1 rights (in the sense of being prior in teleological 
completeness). Long, of course, recognizes that Aristotle “would not have been willing to call the 
prepolitical state a 'state of nature', since for him the natural state is the highest and most developed one, 
that is, the political state” (785 n. 43).  
49 Long (1996), p. 776. 
50 Miller (2002), pp. 386-387. 
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autonomy are intimately interrelated. Both types of autonomy have their basis in 
Aristotle's natural teleology, his philosophical anthropology, and his eudaimonist theory 
of virtue ethics. 
 According to Aristotle human beings have a nature, i.e., an end or telos. The 
natural end of human beings is eudaimonia (flourishing, well-being, or happiness). 
Eudaimonia is “the activity of the soul according to reason (or not without reason), i.e., 
activity in accordance with the most perfect (or complete) virtue or excellence” and it 
includes goods of the soul (e.g., virtue), goods of the body (e.g., health), and external 
goods (e.g., friendship, wealth, liberty).51 Aristotle's conceptions of eudaimonia and 
virtue depend heavily on his conception of the human soul. 
 The human soul for Aristotle consists of irrational (a!logon) and rational (lo&gon) 
parts.52 The irrational and rational parts of the soul each appear to be further subdivided 
into two parts. The two irrational parts of the soul are 1) the vegetative faculty (futiko&n) 
and 2) the appetitive faculty (e)piqumhtiko&n) and in general the desiring faculty 
(o)rektiko&n). The rational part in turn appears to be two-fold: 1) the rational faculty, 
which has reason in the strict sense, with authority (kuri&wj), and in itself, and 2) the 
other, apparently the desiring faculty (o)rektiko&n) insofar as it obeys reason.53 The 
rational faculty is itself further subdivided into two parts with distinctive functions: 1) the 
scientific part (to_ e)pisthmoniko&n), “by which we contemplate the kind of things whose 
                                                 
51 Miller (1995), p. 19. See Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (hereafter NE) I.7 1098a7-17 and I.8 1098b9-
1099b8. 
52 Aristotle rejects Plato's tripartite psychology in which the three parts of the soul have three 
corresponding types of desires; see Miller (1999, 2002: 377) and Aristotle's De Anima (hereafter DA) 
III.9 432b4-7 and III.10 433a21-b4. For Aristotle there is only one faculty of desire, only one source of 
movement for the human soul. 
53 See NE I.13 1102a5-1103a10. On this interpretation, see Miller (1995: 7-8) and Miller (2002: 377). 
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principles cannot be otherwise” (the necessary), and 2) the deliberative or calculative part 
(to_ logistiko&n), “by which we contemplate variable things” (the contingent)54  and 
reason about means and ends.55 
 Aristotle distinguishes between intellectual and ethical virtues. The intellectual 
virtues are excellences of thought whereas the ethical virtues are excellences of character  
expressed in action. Each of the parts of the rational faculty (the scientific and 
deliberative) has its own distinctive set of intellectual virtues. The key intellectual virtues 
for our purposes are sophia (sofi&a; contemplative wisdom) and phronēsis (fro&nhsij; 
practical wisdom or prudence). Sophia belongs to the scientific part of the rational faculty 
and involves excellence in apprehending true first principles and true conclusions drawn 
from them. Aristotle defines phronēsis, which belongs to the deliberative part of the 
rational faculty, as “a state [of the soul] involving truth and reason concerned with action 
regarding things that are good and bad for a human being.”56 The ethical virtues belong to 
the second rational subdivision of the soul, the desiring part insofar as it obeys reason. An 
ethical virtue is an activity of the soul that makes a man good, enabling him to perform 
his function (e!rgon) well, and is a constitutive part of eudaimonia.57 An ethical virtue is a 
right action, a mean (relative to us) between extremes (vices) of excess and deficiency in 
specific contexts. Aristotle argues that practical wisdom is inseparable from the ethical 
virtues: “It is clear, then, from what has been said, that it is not possible to be good in the 
                                                 
54 NE VI.1 1138b36-1139a17. All translations are from the Revised Oxford Translation unless otherwise 
noted. 
55 See DA III.10 433a14. 
56 NE VI.5 1140b4-6; Miller's (1995: 10) translation. 
57 See NE II.6 1106a22-24. 
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strict sense without practical wisdom, nor practically wise without moral excellence.”58 
Aristotle thus implies the unity of virtue, for the presence of practical wisdom entails the 
presence of all the ethical virtues.59 One might pithily say, then, that practical wisdom 
without the ethical virtues is 'empty', while the ethical virtues without practical wisdom 
are 'blind'.60 
 For Aristotle, an agent is autonomous insofar as his soul rules over his body and 
his rational faculty rules over the rest of his soul. How is it, however, that reason can rule 
over desire? Aristotle is a hylomorphist, which means that he views the soul and the body 
as distinct but inseparable (at least for the most part). In terms of his four causes, the 
elements that make up the body are the material cause whereas the soul is the other three 
causes: “the efficient cause (the source of change, and specifically of locomotion),” “the 
final cause or end,” and “the formal cause or essence.”61 Reason is for Aristotle the 
formal and final cause of human beings. 
 Aristotle is clear that the faculty of desire is the source of movement in the soul,62 
although he is also clear that either imagination or thought is also involved.63 Is desire, 
then, the primary cause of human action? And is Aristotle, therefore, a proto-Humean? Is 
reason only the handmaid of desire? Several more of Aristotle's distinctions are pertinent 
here. First, Aristotle distinguishes between imagination and thought. Animals are 
incapable of desire unless they have imagination, and imagination involves perception or 
                                                 
58 NE VI.13 1144b30-32. 
59 See NE VI.13 1144b35-1145a2 
60 This is not, however, to say that practical wisdom can be present without the ethical virtues but in an 
'empty' condition or that the ethical virtues can be present without practical wisdom but in a 'blind' 
condition. Indeed, neither can be present without the other. 
61 Miller (2002), p. 378; cf. DA II.4 415b8-27. 
62 See DA III.10 433a21; cf. 433a31-b1 and 433b10-11 
63 See DA III.10 433a9-26. 
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reason.64 Only human beings, so far as we know, possess reason and are capable of 
thought. Aristotle further distinguishes between perceptual imagination and deliberative 
imagination. Only rational animals are capable of deliberative imagination, while all 
other animals with perception only have perceptual imagination.65 Deliberative 
imagination does involve some conceptualization and reasoning about means. As Miller 
points out, humans “do not merely succumb to temptation; they also figure out how to 
satisfy their aberrant urges.”66 Aristotle says, however, that “thought is always right, but 
[desire] and imagination may be either right or wrong. That is why, though in any case it 
is the object of [desire] which originates movement, this object may be either the real or 
the apparent good.”67 I follow Miller in interpreting the first clause of this passage not as 
“thought is never in error” but as “thought (nous) is able to attain a state of knowledge 
which is certain and inerrant, namely, when it apprehends first principles.”68  
 Second, Aristotle follows Plato in distinguishing three distinct kinds of desire 
(o!recij): appetite (e)piqumi&a), passion (qumo&j), and wish (bou&lhsij).69 Wish is a kind of 
'rational desire' in that it is of the end, rather than the means, and it can be activated by 
reasoning.70 Aristotle points out that not only can desire be opposed to reason, as in the 
case of the incontinent man, but the desires themselves can be opposed to each other. 
This is because beings who are able to perceive time, to distinguish between the present 
and the future, can have for example an appetite for immediate gratification (e.g., to 
                                                 
64 See DA III.10 433b28-30. 
65 See DA III.10 III.12 434a5-10. 
66 Miller (2002), p. 398 n. 67. 
67 DA III.10 433a26-28. 
68 Miller (2002), p. 397 n. 54. 
69 See DA II.3 414b2;  Movement of Animals (MA) 6 700b22, 7 701a36-b1; Magna Moralia (MM) I.12 
1187b37; Eudemian Ethics (EE) II.7 1223a26-27; NE III.2 1111b11. 
70 See Miller (2002), pp. 385 and 400 n. 84. 
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smoke, an apparent good) and a wish for health (a real good).71 Aristotle further remarks: 
The object of desire (o)rekto&n) and the object of thought (nohto&n) bring 
about movement without undergoing movement. Their primary objects are 
the same. For the apparently noble is the object of appetite (e)piqumhto&n), 
and the really noble is the object of wish (boulhto&n). But we have desire 
because we have opinion, rather than having opinion because of having 
desire. And thinking (no&hsij) is the starting-point (a)rxh&). But thought 
(nou~j) is moved by the object of thought (nohto&n).72 
 
For Aristotle, then, the desire is the proximate efficient cause of action and the source of 
movement, but it is the source of movement because the object of desire is the ultimate 
source of movement.73 The object of desire is an unmoved mover, stimulating the 
desiring faculty into movement when it becomes an object for it. Reason, however, plays 
an important role in identifying objects of desire. 
 For Aristotle, eudaimonia and virtue require voluntariness and choice. Voluntary 
actions are those “of which the moving principle is in the agent himself, he being aware 
of the particular circumstances of the action.”74 Involuntary actions, on the other hand, 
are those “done under compulsion or by reason of ignorance,”75 but actions done  “by 
reason of anger [a passion] or appetite are not rightly called involuntary.”76 Aristotle here 
disagrees with Taylor, for whom a deviant desire seems to be an alien desire:77 “the  
 
 
                                                 
71 See DA III.10 433b5-16. Cf. DA III.11 434a11-14. 
72 Metaphysics XII.7 1072a26-30; Miller's (2002: 398 n. 68) translation. Notice how different this is from 
a Humean conative account of reason as subordinate to desire. 
73 Cf. DA III.10 433a27-28, quoted at the end of the previous paragraph. 
74 NE III.1 1111a23-24. 
75 NE III.1 1111a22-23. 
76 NE III.1 1111a25-26. See also a22-b3; note that Aristotle here finds the notion absurd that one's noble 
acts are voluntary and one's base acts involuntary. 
77 This apparent view of Taylor's was observed toward the end of chapter one above. 
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irrational emotions are believed to be not less human, so that the actions resulting from 
passion (qumo&j) or appetite (e)piqumi&a) also belong to a human being.”78 
 Aristotle uses the term choice more narrowly than it seems to be used today. 
Choice is not simply reducible to voluntary action. Other animals and children “share in 
voluntary action, but not in choice.”79 Choice is related to wish and yet it is different, 
because one can wish for the impossible or for something not in one's power but one 
cannot choose the impossible or something beyond one's power.80 Wish is of the end, 
choice of the means: “for instance, we wish to be healthy, but we choose the acts which 
will make us healthy, and we wish to be happy and say we do, but we cannot well say we 
choose to be so; for, in general, choice seems to relate to the things that are in our 
power.”81 Nor is choice simply opinion, for choice has to do with character and therefore 
action.82 Choice follows and is the completion of deliberation:  
The same thing is deliberated upon and is chosen, except that the object of 
choice is already determinate, since it is that which has been decided upon 
as a result of deliberation that is the object of choice. For everyone ceases 
to inquire how to act when he has brought the moving principle back to 
himself and to the ruling part of himself; for this is what chooses....The 
object of choice being one of the things in our own power which is desired 
after deliberation, choice will be deliberate desire of things in our own 
power; for when we have decided as a result of deliberation, we desire in 
accordance with our deliberation.83 
 
 The object of choice, then, the means, is discovered by the deliberative part of the 
rational faculty but the end, the object of wish, is discovered by the scientific part (nou~j). 
                                                 
78 NE III.1 1111b1-2; Miller's (2002: 399 n. 69) translation.  
79 NE III.2 1111b8-9. 
80 See NE III.2 1111b20-25. 
81 NE III.2 1111b26-30. 
82 See NE III.2 1112a1-5. 
83 NE III.3 1113a3-13. 
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To the extent that one reasons well, to the extent that one exercises practical and 
contemplative wisdom, one can know his natural end and the proper means to achieve it 
and act accordingly. By employing reason to identify the proper ends one ought to pursue 
and the proper means for achieving them, a human being enables them to become objects 
of desire for himself. Aristotle identifies three conditions that an agent must be in for his 
acts to be considered virtuous: “in the first place he must have knowledge, secondly he 
must choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes, and thirdly his action must 
proceed from a firm and unchangeable character.”84 Miller sums up this account of the 
rule of reason nicely: 
The foregoing analysis explains how Aristotle could think of reason as 
having as its proper role the rule over the soul, even though it is not a 
proximate cause of action on a par with desire. By revealing to agents their 
natural end, it enables this end, which is as such unmoved, to become an 
object of action for the agent, and thereby to bring about desire, the 
movement or change in the soul which is the proximate cause of action. 
Although he speaks of desire as the source of movement, Aristotle is not a 
Humean, because thought enables desire to find its proper end. But, 
although Aristotle speaks of the rule of reason, he is not a Kantian either. 
For Kant practical reason discovers the moral law by abstracting entirely 
from human nature and appealing to the necessities of action among 
rational wills in general. Aristotle differs from both Hume and Kant in that 
he explains the roles of reason and desire in terms of his natural 
teleology.85 
 
 It might be objected, however, as Aristotle anticipates, “that all men aim at the 
apparent good, but have no control over how things appear to him; but the end appears to 
each man in a form answering to his character.”86 Roderick Long's reconstruction of 
Aristotle's theory of natural freedom, which he sees as a corollary of Aristotle's theory of 
                                                 
84 NE II.5 1105a30-b1. 
85 Miller (2002), p. 385. 
86 NE III.5 1114a31-b2. 
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natural slavery, provides a good refutation of this objection:87 
Our rational capacities give us the ability to stand in judgment over our 
natural impulses instead of being controlled by them; natural slaves lack 
this ability entirely, while free women are said to have it only imperfectly 
(the capacity is a!xuron, noncontrolling),88 while free adult Greek males 
have it in complete functionality (which is not to say that they always 
make proper use of it). Anything which lacks a rational capacity is the 
deterministic slave of the forces acting upon it; in a given set of 
circumstances, a nonrational potentiality can only produce a single 
outcome.89 The rational capacities of humans in normal condition, by 
contrast account for their possession of free will and moral responsibility – 
the fact that at least some actions are up to us to perform or not, as we 
choose.90 Human free choice breaks the chain of necessitation and allows 
us to transcend the natural order.91 Rational potentialities are what enable 
us to choose the bad as well as the good,92 because they enable us to 
control how the end appears to us;93 thus rational potentialities are also at 
the root of our liability to weakness of will,94 since the key to weakness of 
will lies in our capacity to focus our attention on some values and avoid 
thinking of others.95 Thus Aristotle's theory of the right to freedom, like 
the Kantian liberal theory, bases itself on the metaphysico-ethical capacity 
of autonomous rational agents to transcend the motivational force of 
sensible appearances.96 
 
Additionally, immediately after stating the aforementioned objection, Aristotle goes on to 
reject it explicitly: 
We reply that if each man is somehow responsible for the state he is in, he 
will also be himself somehow responsible for how things appear; but if 
                                                 
87 Long (1996), pp. 801-802. See Politics I.3-8, 12-13. 
88 See Politics I.13 1260a13. 
89 See Meta. IX.5 1047b35-1048a25. 
90 See EE II.6 1222b41-1223a15; NE III.5 1113b2-1114a3; MM I.11 1187b10-20, I.18 1189b37-1190a2. 
91 See On Interpretation 9 18b31-19a12; Meta. VII.3 1027a29-b16. 
92 See EE II.10 1227a21-32. 
93 See NE III.5 1114a30-1115a3. 
94 See DA III.9 433a1-4; Problems XXX.12 956b33-37. 
95 See NE VII.3 1146b31-1147a24; cf. EE II.9 1225b10-16 and DA II.5 417b21-27. 
96 Long (1996), p. 802. For a more detailed defense of these interpretive claims, see Long (1992). Long's 
account of Aristotelian autonomy here seems to correspond to two aspects of autonomy: what has been 
referred to as global autonomy or self-direction and the political dimension of local autonomy that 
liberals commonly refer to as liberty. Miller's account of Aristotelian autonomy includes but does not 
seem to differentiate both global and local autonomy. It also bears pointing out that Aristotle's notion of 
rational choice is not one of radically free choice; he does not build his philosophy on a concept of pure 
reason. 
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not, no one is responsible for his own evildoing, but everyone does evil 
acts through ignorance of the end, thinking that by these he will get what 
is best, and the aiming at the end is not self-chosen....If this is true, then, 
how will excellence be more voluntary than vice? To both men alike, the 
good and the bad, the end appears and is fixed by nature however it may 
be, and it is by referring everything else to this that men do whatever they 
do.97 
 
Aristotle concludes: “If, then, as is asserted, the excellences are voluntary (for we are 
ourselves somehow part-causes of our states of character, and it is by being persons of a 
certain kind that we assume the end to be so and so), the vices also will be voluntary; for 
the same is true of them.”98 Thus, metaphysical, biological and social determinism all 
appear to be ruled out by Aristotle. 
 To weave together the threads of the foregoing discussion: Aristotle's conception 
of individual autonomy is that of the soul ruling over the body and, within the soul, 
reason ruling over desire. This conception of autonomy is twofold: first and 
fundamentally, there is global autonomy or self-direction (i.e., the exercise of one's 
rational capacities) which makes the second, local autonomy, possible. It is the former in 
which moral agency and much of moral responsibility are grounded. Regarding 
Aristotle's psychological and ethical theory, Miller states: “In an incontinent person, the 
desiring part opposes reason and the agent thus fails to act rationally;99 in a continent 
person, this part 'listens to' reason even though he is tempted to do otherwise; and in a 
virtuous agent, the desiring part is in complete agreement with reason.”100 To speak more 
precisely, then, an agent is (locally) autonomous insofar as the desiring part of his soul is 
                                                 
97 NE III.5 1114b2-16 
98 NE III.5 1114b21-25. 
99 See NE III.2 1111b13-18 and VI.6 1149b3. 
100 Miller (1995), p. 8. 
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in agreement with reason. Given that the telos for human beings is a life of reason, this 
implies that an agent is heteronomous insofar as the desiring part of his soul opposes 
reason, that is, to the extent that he acts contrary to his eudaimonia. To be more precise 
still, an agent is autonomous with respect to a particular desire, preference, action, and so 
forth if it is in accord with reason (or his eudaimonia); contrariwise, he is heteronomous 
with respect to a particular desire, preference, action, and so forth if it opposes reason (or 
his eudaimonia). 
 One condition for or dimension of autonomy that needs to be further elaborated 
upon is that an agent's actions must be voluntary. It will thus be necessary to examine the 
role that liberty plays in Aristotle's ethical and political theory. Long argues that liberty is 
an external good for Aristotle. He distinguishes between two different meanings of 
external, however: “An external1 good is one that is external to body and soul; that is, one 
that consists largely or solely in facts about the agent's environment. By contrast, an 
external2 good is one that is external to the agent's well-being; that is, its value is purely 
instrumental.”101 Miller seems to concede to communitarians that liberty is an external2 
good for Aristotle with these remarks: “Aristotle...evidently relegated liberty to the status 
of a mere external good” and “freedom is only instrumentally valuable.”102 Long argues 
that, to the contrary, Aristotle treats liberty as an external1 good but not also as an 
external2 good.  
 Like friendship, liberty is an external1 good but is not merely of instrumental 
value. It is a constitutive part of eudaimonia. We have already seen that voluntary action 
                                                 
101 Long (1996), p. 787. 
102 Miller (1995), p. 356 and 356 n. 46, respectively. 
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for Aristotle is that in which “the moving principle is in the agent himself”103 and that 
actions done under compulsion are involuntary.104 When one is physically coerced the 
moving principle is not in the agent himself.105 We have also seen that for actions to be 
considered virtuous or vicious, and by implication for someone to achieve eudaimonia, 
the agent must act voluntarily and not under compulsion.106 Additionally, Long makes the 
following points: He observes that Aristotle says in the Politics that “slavery is 
inconsistent with self-sufficiency (a)uta&rxeia).”107 In the Nicomachean Ethics, we see 
that self-sufficiency is a formal requirement of eudaimonia,108 and that “subordination to 
another person, being slavish, is inconsistent with greatness of soul.”109 We are also told 
in the Politics that “virtuous people must be spirited and that spiritedness involves an 
inclination toward freedom.”110 Moreover, Aristotle argues that deviant constitutions are 
despotic whereas a polis “is a community of freemen.”111 Finally, in the Metaphysics, 
Aristotle anticipates Kant when he says “the man is free...who exists for himself and not 
another.”112  
 As the foregoing analysis implies, liberty and individual autonomy are intimately 
interrelated with political autonomy. Miller argues that “political autonomy (political rule 
according to law) requires some measure, at least, of individual autonomy (self-
governance of the soul): that is, a city-state is (politically) autonomous only if the citizens 
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are (individually) autonomous to some degree.”113 The individual citizens must be able to 
rule themselves rationally before being fully able politically to rule and be ruled in turn. 
Political autonomy also requires, among other things, the consent of the governed to the 
constitution of the polis.114 Miller argues that consent is merely evidence of a just 
constitution for Aristotle: “Aristotle gives no indication of...treating the consent of the 
governed as a justification for political authority. Rather, his view is that the voluntary 
compliance of the subjects to political rule is evidence that the political rule is 
justified.”115 But as Long points out, Aristotle suggests otherwise: 
Yet it would, like as not, seem highly absurd to those willing to reflect, if 
this should be the task of the politikou~: to be attending to how he can 
rule and despotize (despo&zh) over his neighbors, both those who are 
willing and those who are not willing. For how can that be politiko&n, or 
appropriate to a lawgiver, which at any rate is not even lawful? Now to 
rule not only rightly but wrongly is unlawful, and to dominate is not also 
to do so rightly. Nor yet do we see this in the other sciences; for it is not 
the task (e!rgon) of a healer, nor of a steersman, to either persuade or 
coerce, the one his patients and the other his passengers [but only to 
persuade them]. But most people seem to think despotic art is politikh&n. 
And precisely what they each will say is neither right nor advantageous 
with regard to themselves, this they are not ashamed to practice toward  
others; for they seek rightful rule for themselves, but toward others they 
have no concern for the things that are right.116 
 
Long argues that this passage is a reply to Plato's argument in the Politicus that, 
analogous to a good physician, the “true politiko&j...is not one who rules over willing 
subjects, but rather one who rules wisely, be his subjects willing or unwilling.”117 
                                                 
113 Miller (2002), p. 390. 
114 See Politics II.11 1272b30-31, III.14 1285a27-b21, IV.10 1295a15-24, V.10 1313a5-10, VII.2 
1324b22-26. 
115 Miller (1995), p. 273. 
116 Politics VII.2 1324b22-36; Long's (1996: 790) translation. The brackets are his. Cf. Politics VII.14 
1333B5-1334a10. 
117 Long (1996), p. 790. Cf. Plato's Politicus [Statesman] 276d-277a and 291e-293e. 
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Aristotle here turns Plato's argument on its head by denying his “assumption that the 
consent of the patient is irrelevant to the e!rgon of medicine; and he insists that to rule 
against the will of the ruled is a violation of [natural] law and [natural] justice.”118 
 This consent of the governed is no mere consent of the majority but must be 
unanimous consent. This is the case because, as Miller convincingly argues in Nature, 
Justice, and Rights,  
Aristotle implies that the best polis is a group of individuals co-operating 
for mutual [not the overall] advantage, when he characterizes it as 'a 
community of similar persons for the sake of the best possible life' ([VII.8] 
1328a35-7). It is implied that all members of the polis must take part in 
the good life, since the inhabitants who play a merely functional role in 
promoting the end without partaking are adjuncts rather than members (cf. 
IV 4 1291a24-8).119 
 
As evidence, among others, Miller cites the following passage from Aristotle's Politics: 
But a polis is excellent due to the fact that the citizens who partake in the 
constitution are excellent; but in our case all the citizens partake in the 
constitution. We must therefore enquire as to how a man becomes 
excellent; for even if all the citizens could be excellent without each of the 
citizens [being excellent], the latter would be more choiceworthy; for 'all' 
follows from 'each'.120 
 
In other words, a polis that does not have the consent of every citizen or does not promote 
the eudaimonia of every citizen is not a just polis. Consent, of course, is not enough by 
itself to establish political autonomy and justify political rule. As the foregoing has 
suggested, it is also necessary that the constitution of the polis be in accord with natural 
justice and, more generally, that it promotes the eudaimonia of each and every one of its 
citizens. 
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120 Politics VII.13 1332a32-38; Miller's (1995: 222) translation. The brackets are his. 
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 An important qualification needs to be made regarding the role of consent in 
Aristotle's political theory, however. Long remarks that “Aristotle's focus is on consent to 
the political framework, rather than on consent within the political framework. 
Liberalism, of course, has traditionally been concerned with both.”121 Long points out 
that it is important to take note of the different uses to which Aristotle put the terms 
e)leuqeri&a and e)cousi&a. Both can be translated as “freedom” or “liberty,” but e)leuqeri&a 
“represents the condition of not being ruled against one's interest and without one's 
consent” and “is for the most part a matter of consent to the constitution as a whole” 
while e)cousi&ai “are specific freedoms one is allowed under that constitution.”122 The 
following passage from the Metaphysics is evidence that Aristotle did not think 
e)leuqeri&a necessarily implied any and all e)cousi&ai: 
For all things are ordered together in relation to one end; but, just as in a 
household, to those who are free (e)leuqe&roij) it is least open [h!kista 
e!cestin; note that e!cestin is the verb form of e)cousi&a] to act as chance 
dictates, but rather, all or most things are ordained, whereas for slaves and 
beasts little is ordained toward the common end, and most is as chance 
dictates.123 
 
For liberals and for the Athenian democrats, e)leuqeri&a is not separable from e)cousi&a; 
but Aristotle rejects this conception of e)leuqeri&a: “It is thought that...doing whatever one 
wishes counts as being free (e)leu&qeron). Thus, in democracies of this sort, each person 
lives as he wishes....But this is base; for one should not deem it slavery, but rather 
salvation, to live according to the constitution.”124 Hence, the door to paternalistic 
legislation is open. 
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123 Meta. XII.9 1075a18-23; Long's (1996: 795) translation. The brackets are his. 
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 However, there are at least two rights in particular, highly valued by (classical) 
liberals, that Aristotle also recognizes and values: the right to bear arms and the right to 
private property. According to Aristotle, the “constitution must be confined to those who 
bear arms.”125 Indeed, ancient Athens possessed no standing army or police force. It 
relied on a citizen militia. Aristotle's reasons for advocating an armed citizenry are the 
same as the reasoning for the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution, viz., 
so that the citizens could ward off both threats from abroad and tyranny at home.126 An 
unarmed citizenry is virtually an enslaved one.127 It is tyrannies and oligarchies, and 
certainly not the best polis, that do not trust the general population with arms.128 
 In Politics II.5, Aristotle claims that private property is necessary for virtuous 
actions: for example, generosity.129 Miller correctly observes that Aristotle does not 
explicitly “endorse a Locke-style labour theory of acquisition,”130 but Long argues that 
Aristotle does do much to lay the groundwork for such a theory.131 Long points out that 
“Aristotle, like the Lockean liberal,132 insists that one's property is an extension of 
oneself;133 it is for this reason that our property is so precious to us, as something that is 
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our own.”134 Most significantly, Long adds, property comes to have this relationship to 
and importance for us precisely because we have produced it.135 Aristotle states: 
The cause of this is that existence is to all men a thing to be chosen and 
loved, and that we exist by virtue of activity (i.e., by living and acting), 
and that the handiwork is in a sense, the producer of activity; he loves his 
handiwork, therefore, because he loves existence. And this is rooted in the  
nature of things; for what he is in potentiality, his handiwork manifests in 
activity.136 
 
 It remains to explain precisely just what political autonomy and political rule are 
for Aristotle. To begin with, Aristotle distinguishes political rule from other forms of rule 
such as kingly, despotical, and household management.137 “When the government is 
personal, the ruler is a king; when, according to the rules of the political science, the 
citizens rule and are ruled in turn, then he is called a statesman” and there is political 
rule.138 Those who know only how to rule and not how to be ruled as well as those who 
know only how to be ruled and not how to rule are not capable of political rule.139  
 Aristotle remarks that “there are different kinds of citizens; and he is a citizen in 
the fullest sense who shares in the honours of the state. Compare Homer's words 'like 
some dishonoured stranger';140 he who is excluded from the honours of the state is no 
better than an alien.”141 A polis “ought to be composed, as far as possible, of equals and 
similars.”142 It is the virtuous who possess individual autonomy, or the greatest measure 
of it, and in the best polis the citizenry will all be virtuous and roughly equally so. The 
                                                 
134 Long (1996), p. 800. See Politics II.4 1262b22-23, II.5 1263a40-b5; Rhetoric I.11 1371b12-28. 
135 Ibid. 
136 NE IX.7 1168a5-10. 
137 See Politics I.1 1252a7-9; cf. I.3 1253b19-20. 
138 Politics I.1 1152a14-17. 
139 See Politics IV.11 1296b15-26. 
140 Iliad IX.648. 
141 Politics III.5 1278a35-38. 
142 Politics IV.11 1295b25-26; cf. I.7 1255b19-20, III.6 1279a8-16, and III.17 1287b37-1288a5. 
 39
reason for this lies in Aristotle's conception of distributive justice and, particularly in 
relation to the question of who should rule, what has come to be called the merit 
principle. In discussing the just distribution of political offices, Aristotle makes the 
following argument: 
All men think justice to be a sort of equality; and to a certain extent they 
agree with what we have said in our philosophical work about ethics. For 
they say that what is just is just for someone and that it should be equal for 
equals. But there still remains the question: equality or inequality of 
what?...But if wealth and freedom are necessary elements, justice and 
valour are equally so; for without the former qualities a [polis] cannot 
exist at all, without the latter not well....If the existence of the [polis] is 
alone to be considered, then it would seem that all, or some at least, of 
these claims are just; but, if we take into account a good life [which is the 
telos of the polis], then, as I have already said, education and excellence 
have superior claims.143 
 
Our conclusion, then, is that political society exists for the sake of noble 
actions, and not of living together. Hence they who contribute the most to 
such a society have a greater share in it than those who have the same or a 
greater freedom or nobility of birth but are inferior to them in political 
excellence; or than those who exceed them in wealth but are surpassed by 
them in excellence.144 
 
Thus, a polis that is politically autonomous will consist of citizens who are virtuous and 
roughly equal in this regard so that they can justly rule and be ruled in turn. 
 Both individual and political autonomy depend upon the citizens receiving a 
proper education, however, for virtuous behavior generally requires education beginning 
in childhood. Aristotle, in essence, discusses two forms of education pertaining to 
intellectual virtue and ethical virtue, respectively, in Nicomachean Ethics II.1. 
“[I]ntellectual excellence in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for 
which reason it requires experience and time), while moral excellence comes about as a 
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result of habit.”145 It is the task of legislators to “make citizens good by forming habits in 
them...and those who do not effect it miss their mark, and it is in this that a good 
constitution differs from a bad one.”146 The legislators or lawmakers must design the 
constitution and the law, which need not be written,147 so that the polis will perform its  
proper educative function of teaching the citizens intellectual virtue and habituating them 
in ethical virtue, for 
the paternal command indeed has not the required force or compulsive 
power (nor in general has the command of one man, unless he be a king or 
something similar), but the law has compulsive power, while it is at the 
same time an account proceeding from a sort of practical wisdom and 
intellect. And while people hate men who oppose their impulses, even if 
they oppose them rightly, the law in its ordaining of what is good is not 
burdensome.148 
 
 Aristotelian autonomy has much to recommend it over Kantian autonomy and the  
major theories of autonomy in contemporary analytic philosophy. Unlike Kant, Aristotle 
does not base autonomy on so-called pure reason abstracted out from man's animal 
nature, desires, and the particulars that are so vitally relevant to morality. Unlike the 
analytic theories, Aristotelian autonomy is not burdened by a hierarchical, and often 
Humean, conative psychology. Aristotelian autonomy, instead, is natural and teleological 
and takes into account the nature and requirements of human flourishing. 
 However, from the point of view of the modern liberal, Aristotle's conception of 
autonomy is deficient in a number of ways. First, Aristotle's conception of eudaimonia is 
arguably overly monistic, focusing on a rather narrow conception of the contemplative 
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life, the political life, or some combination of the two. Despite his significantly greater 
recognition of the value of diversity and the individualized and diverse nature of human 
flourishing than Plato, he did not appreciate them fully. Second, Aristotle did not fully 
understand the nature, value, and fundamental importance of individual liberty for human 
flourishing. Third, he wrongly attributes to nature rather than cultural factors and mere 
prejudice on his part the alleged rational deficiency of women compared to that of men 
and of non-Greeks compared to Greeks. Fourth, he conflates the state and civil society in 
his conception of the polis, a conflation that might have been unavoidable in the era of 
the Greek city-state but can no longer be excusable in light of modern experiences, 
theory, and historical knowledge. The conflation of state and civil society can only lead 
to conceptual confusion, paternalism, and totalitarianism. Fifth, he overestimates the 
power and efficacy of the state to educate its citizens in virtue.  
 Two central principles that Aristotle accepts – the principle of community and the 
principle of rulership – have little if any validity for classical liberals and libertarians. 
The principle of community holds that “individuals can attain the good only if they 
belong to and are subject to the authority of the political community,” and the principle of 
rulership holds that “the community can function only if an order is imposed on it by 
rational agents.”149 Ronald Hamowy observes: “For at least two hundred years [owing to 
the Scottish Enlightenment], social philosophers have known that association does not 
need government, that, indeed, government is destructive of association.”150 Scottish 
Enlightenment thinkers like Adam Ferguson, David Hume, and Adam Smith as well as 
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modern thinkers like Austrian economist F.A. Hayek have theorized about and described 
the emergence of society, culture, law, language, and markets as spontaneous orders. A 
significant body of literature exists demonstrating both theoretically and historically that 
legislative law and a state-run public education system are inferior to the educative power 
of societal norms, customary law, market forces, and private educational organizations 
such as the family, churches, and private schools. The former are also, generally, counter-
productive. And whether individuals can attain the good only if they are subject to the 
















III. Aristotelian-Liberal Autonomy 
 The burgeoning tradition of Aristotelian liberalism combines Aristotle's concern 
with eudaimonia and virtue with the classical liberal/libertarian emphasis on the 
importance of individual liberty, pluralism, individuality, and the free market. Liberals 
have for the most part up till now, with the exception of left-liberals, focused primarily or 
exclusively on negative individual liberty. Negative liberty is most clearly defined as 
freedom from the threat or use of physical force (including fraud). Contemporary 
conceptions of autonomy generally incorporate negative liberty, although its importance 
and nature are often not well understood or consistently defended. Also included in 
contemporary conceptions of autonomy are vague notions of so-called positive liberties 
or freedoms. For instance, it is rightly pointed out that there are subtler forms of coercion 
than the more clearly problematic threat or use of physical force. Classical liberals and 
libertarians ought to take note of this and take seriously the possibility that certain forms 
of non-rights-violating behavior and social institutions might be inimical to a free society 
and human flourishing. On the other hand, not all of the behaviors, social institutions and 
social influences claimed to be illegitimate, unjust or what have you actually are. We can 
also distinguish non-social, or less directly social, impediments to one's autonomy such 
as severe addiction to drugs, deep-seated emotional or self-control issues, and so forth. 
Moreover, it is fashionable nowadays to advocate methods or policies for the removal of 
such impediments for some persons or groups in order to promote their autonomy, the 
implementation of which must necessarily compromise the autonomy (negative liberty) 
of others and possibly of the intended beneficiaries as well. Finally, as we have seen in 
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chapters one and two, there are different ways in which we can conceive of autonomy: 
e.g., global or local, individual or group. Thus, before laying out the Aristotelian-liberal 
theory of autonomy in detail, it will be necessary to develop a new taxonomy of 
autonomy. 
 It seems sensible to begin with Miller's distinction, discussed in chapter two, 
between individual and group autonomy. Group autonomy is the autonomy of individuals 
as a group. Perhaps the most commonly recognized form of group autonomy is political 
autonomy, or political self-rule. Individual autonomy is a property of individuals 
considered, as the term suggests, individually. Note that this does not necessarily entail 
conceiving of human beings as essentially a-social or apart from society or in a state of 
nature. Within individual autonomy we can further distinguish global and local 
dimensions. Global autonomy is the exercise of one's rational capacities. This is similar 
to Dworkin's account of autonomy discussed in chapter one. Local autonomy is 
individual autonomy with respect one's particular desires, preferences, actions, and so 
forth. Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl refer to what I have here labeled global 
autonomy as self-direction. In order to maintain continuity with their work, upon which I 
will draw heavily in the following pages, and for the sake of clarity and simplicity, I will 
be using the term self-direction in place of global autonomy and will refer to local 
autonomy simply as autonomy. Self-direction can be compromised, and when not 
compromised it can be exercised well or poorly. 
 It bears pointing out that (local) autonomy can be distinguished yet further in two 
ways. First, autonomy can be considered in relation to particular desires, preferences, 
 45
actions, and so forth taken singly; or it can be considered in relation to particular desires, 
preferences, actions, and so forth in the aggregate. In the former case, one is either 
autonomous with respect to a particular desire, etc., or one is not. The latter case is a 
matter of degree, one is more or less autonomous in proportion to the number of desires, 
etc., in relation to which one is autonomous and/or heteronomous. Granted, there are 
obvious epistemic difficulties with respect to judging the degree of autonomy possessed 
by particular individuals, but this does not vitiate the theoretical usefulness of the 
distinction. 
 Second, in light of the difficulties mentioned in the introductory paragraph of this 
chapter, it seems necessary to conceptually distinguish three dimensions of autonomy: 
political, social, and personal. Political autonomy is here roughly equivalent to the 
traditional classical liberal/libertarian concept of liberty (or negative liberty). I therefore 
use these terms interchangeably; and because of this traditional meaning of liberty, and to 
avoid common and unnecessary confusions, I prefer to restrict the usage of liberty to this 
meaning, viz., freedom from the threat or use of physical force. Autonomy therefore has a 
broader meaning than liberty, and freedom a broader meaning still. The threat or use of 
physical force clearly constitutes a violation of autonomy, or at least this should be clear, 
and it bears noting here, though more will be said on this later, that it is the surest means 
of compromising self-direction. This has not deterred so-called advocates of autonomy 
from calling for and supporting organizations and policies that constitute the threat or use 
of initiatory physical force in the name of promoting other dimensions of autonomy, 
however. I define social autonomy as freedom from social influences other than the threat 
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or use of physical force that lead a person to deviate from his telos.151 Personal 
autonomy, in turn, is internal freedom from deviant desires, severe addiction to drugs, 
and so forth that lead a person to deviate from his telos. The usefulness of and 
justification for these numerous distinctions within the concept of autonomy, as well as a 
clearer understanding of their nature, will become more apparent as the Aristotelian-
liberal theory of autonomy is laid out. 
 Before self-direction and the dimensions of autonomy can be profitably discussed, 
some preliminary work must be done. The Aristotelian-liberal conception of eudaimonia 
must first be examined. Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl argue that eudaimonia 
or human flourishing has six basic and interrelated features: it is 1) objective, 2) 
inclusive, 3) individualized, 4) agent-relative, 5) self-directed, and 6) social.152 Arguably, 
Aristotle's conception of eudaimonia incorporates all of these features. The differences in 
the neo-Aristotelian account described here are the greater emphasis on the 
individualized nature of flourishing, the open-ended and potentially cosmopolitan nature 
of human sociality, and the greater recognition of the importance of liberty to human 
flourishing. 
 In addition to the Aristotelian account of eudaimonia given in the previous 
chapter, it is instructive to have a look at some observations of the Roman orator and 
statesman Cicero, whom I interpret to be elaborating upon the role of both the universal 
and the particular in Aristotle's ethical theory. In Book I of De Officiis he discusses the 
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four personae, or roles, the requirements of which all men must fulfill in order to live the  
Good Life: universal human nature (i.e., reason) and the individual's inborn talents, social 
context, and personal choice. 
Furthermore, one must understand that we have been dressed, as it were, 
by nature for two roles: one is common, arising from the fact that we all 
have a share in reason and in the superiority by which we surpass the brute 
creatures. Everything honourable and seemly is derived from this, and 
from it we discover a method of finding out our duty. The other, however, 
is that assigned specifically to individuals. For just as there are enormous 
bodily differences (for some, as we see, their strength is the speed that 
they can run, for others the might with which they wrestle; again, some 
have figures that are dignified, others that are graceful), similarly there are 
still greater differences in men's spirits. (I.108) 
 
Each person should hold on to what is his as far as it is not vicious, but is 
peculiar to him, so that the seemliness that we are seeking might more 
easily be maintained. For we must act in such a way that we attempt 
nothing contrary to universal nature; but while conserving that, let us 
follow our own nature, so that even if other pursuits may be weightier and 
better, we should measure our own by the rule of our own nature. For it is 
appropriate neither to fight against nature nor to pursue anything that you 
cannot attain. Consequently, it becomes clearer what that seemliness is 
like, precisely because nothing is seemly 'against Minerva's will', as they 
say, that is, when your nature opposes and fights against it. (I.110) 
 
If anything at all is seemly, nothing, surely is more so than an evenness 
both of one's whole life and of one's individual actions. You cannot 
preserve that if you copy someone else's nature and ignore your own. [...] 
(I.111) 
 
To the two roles of which I spoke above, a third is added: this is imposed 
by some chance or circumstance. There is also a fourth, which we assume 
for ourselves by our own decision. Kingdoms, military powers, nobility, 
political honours, wealth and influence, as well as the opposites of these, 
are in the gift of chance and governed by circumstances. In addition, 
assuming a role that we want ourselves is something that proceeds from 
our own will; as a consequence, some people apply themselves to 
philosophy, others to civil law, and others again to oratory, while even in 
the case of the virtues, different men prefer to excel in different of them. 
(I.115)153 
                                                 




Cicero unfortunately means one's social context as imposing a wide range of obligations 
beyond the realm of personal choice, as long as they are not contrary to nature or beyond 
one's ability. Thus, the mere accident of birth into a noble family with a long lineage of 
public service imposes the obligation of maintaining and furthering the family's heritage 
and position in society with one's own deeds. Thus, also, is a Roman obligated to serve 
the Roman Republic to the best of his ability so long as nothing he does or is called upon 
to do is contrary to nature. The crux of the issue, of course, lies in how one defines the 
relationship between particular social contexts and nature. 
The scope of personal choice seems rather limited in the Roman context. We have 
as an example of the dominant role of social context Cicero’s admonition to his son in De 
Officiis: 
Anyone who is thinking about embarking upon an honourable life ought to 
do so [learn about duties from the Stoics], but perhaps no one more than 
you. For you carry this burden: many expect you to emulate my diligence, 
most my honours, and some, perhaps, even my renown. Besides, you have 
incurred a weighty responsibility from Athens and from Cratippus; since 
you went to them as if going to purchase arts of good quality, it would be 
most dishonourable to return empty-handed, thus disgracing the authority 
of both city and master. Therefore, strive with as much spirit and struggle 
with as much effort as you can (if learning is an effort, and not a pleasure) 
in order that you may succeed, and not, instead, allow yourself to seem to 
have let yourself down, even though we have provided everything for you. 
(III.6)154 
 
In this one passage we see the chain of unchosen obligations of Cicero’s son, i.e., an 
obligation to educate himself in such a way that he can follow in his father’s footsteps 
and therefore an obligation to his teachers and even the city of Athens itself. This is not to 
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say that all of our obligations are chosen; rather, it is merely to criticize Cicero and 
Aristotle for their inadequate recognition of the diversity of human flourishing and the 
value of flourishing diversity. 
 To return from this brief but useful digression to the nature of eudaimonia, 
according to the Aristotelian-liberal account presented here, human flourishing is 
objective. As noted in the previous chapter, desire plays an important role in eudaimonia 
and virtue. However, flourishing is “an object of desire because it is desirable and choice-
worthy, not simply because it is desired or chosen.”155 Flourishing as the ultimate good 
must be understood in a biocentric context. It is both a way of living and, as we shall see, 
a way of living.156 As Philippa Foot points out: “The structure of the derivation is the 
same whether we derive an evaluation of the roots of a particular tree or the action of a 
particular human being. The meaning of the words 'good' and 'bad' is not different when 
used in features of plants on the one hand and humans on the other, but is rather the same 
applied, in judgments of natural goodness and defect, in the case of all living things.”157 
Flourishing is activity expressive and productive of the actualization of potentialities 
specific to the being's natural kind, including both its universal and its unique particular 
aspects. A human being is a rational animal, but he is also a rational animal with a 
particular set of physical and mental abilities and talents peculiar to himself as well as a 
unique social and historical context and his own personal choices. All of these are factors 
in an individual's own eudaimonia; more on this will be said in the discussion of the 
individualized nature of human flourishing, however. Rasmussen and Den Uyl remark: 
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“Ontologically considered, human flourishing is an activity, an actuality, and an end (or 
function) that is realized (or performed) through choice. Human flourishing is not the 
mere possession of needed goods and virtues.”158 It is a self-directed activity: flourishing, 
and all of the goods and virtues that constitute it, exist as such only through a person's 
own efforts. Finally, in a teleological theory, flourishing, as the ultimate end, “is thus 
ultimately the standard by which human desires, wishes, and choices, are evaluated.”159 
 Human flourishing is an inclusive end, not a dominant or exclusive one. As 
Rasmussen and Den Uyl argue, human flourishing “is the ultimate end of human conduct, 
but it is not the only activity of inherent worth. It is not a 'dominant' end that reduces the 
value of everything else to that of a mere means to it.”160 It is plural and complex, not 
monistic and simple. To quote J. L. Akrill, it is “the most final end and is never sought 
for the sake of anything else, because it includes all final ends.”161 Human flourishing is 
inclusive in that it consists of basic or, to use Rasmussen and Den Uyl's term, “generic” 
goods and virtues. Goods such as those listed by Aristotle in Rhetoric 1362b10-28: for 
example, justice, knowledge, friendship, health, wealth, honor and so forth. Virtues such 
as justice, courage, temperance, generosity and so forth. These goods and virtues are final 
ends and intrinsically valuable; and they are expressions or constitutive of flourishing as 
well as partial realizations of it.162 This is possible because flourishing is a “continuous 
process of living well,” not a future good received at the end of one's life or a good that,  
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once achieved, is never lost;163 hence, in part, Aristotle's pointed addendum, “in a 
complete life.”164 
 As Cicero's four personae imply, but as he does not fully appreciate, human 
flourishing is highly 
individualized and diverse. It depends on who as well as what one is. 
Abstractly considered, we can speak of human flourishing and of basic or 
generic goods and virtues that help to define it. Yet, this does not make 
human flourishing in reality either abstract or universal. Concretely 
speaking, no two cases of human flourishing are the same, and they are 
not interchangeable....There are individuative as well as generic 
potentialities and this makes human fulfillment always something 
unique.165 
 
An examination of human nature cannot reveal the proper weighting, balance, or 
proportion of the generic goods and virtues for each individual. Indeed, these goods and 
virtues do not exist as such except as concrete goods and virtues for particular individuals  
as they achieve and enjoy them through their own efforts in specific contexts. Human 
beings are not mere loci in which these goods and virtues qua universals are instantiated. 
These generic goods and virtues are “generalized abstractions of common needs and 
capacities and not independent realities in their own right.”166 Thus, human flourishing is 
not a one-size-fits-all standard, nor is its diversity limited to the level of particular 
communities, yet it is nevertheless the objective and ultimate standard of goodness but on 
an individual level. “This account of human flourishing is, then, a version of moral 
pluralism. There are many summa bona, because each individual's flourishing is the  
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summum bonum for him- or herself and because there is no single summum bonum 
without unique form or apart from the lives of individual human beings.”167 
 “Human flourishing is agent-relative; it is always and necessarily the good for 
some person or other.”168 Agent-relative value is contrasted with its opposite: agent-
neutral value and the ethical impersonalism based on it. Rasmussen and Den Uyl say 
“that an ethical theory is impersonal when all ultimately morally salient values, reasons, 
and rankings are 'agent-neutral'; and they are agent-neutral when they do not involve as 
part of their description an essential reference to the person for whom the value or reason 
exists or the ranking is correct. One person can be substituted for any other.”169 Agent-
neutrality and ethical impersonalism are exceedingly common in modern ethical theories, 
particularly of Kantian and utilitarian varieties. Aristotelian-liberals, however, reject as 
wrongheaded the notion that particular and contingent facts such as individual, social and 
cultural differences are ethically irrelevant; quite the opposite, such factors are vitally 
important. 
 Rasmussen and Den Uyl observe that there are three possible confusions 
regarding agent-relativity: 1) Agent-neutrality is often confused with objectivity, while 
agent-relativity is often confused with subjectivity; but agent-relativity is compatible with 
objectivity due to the fact that the good for Aristotelian and neo-Aristotelian philosophy 
is objective because of “real potentialities, needs, and circumstances that characterize 
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both what and who a person is” and not merely because it is desired.170 2) It might be 
thought that because something is of value only to and for someone it must be of merely 
instrumental value, but this has already been shown not to be the case. 3) It might be 
thought that agent-relativity is merely a form of self-regarding-only egoism, but agent-
relativity is not incompatible with other-regarding concern. Indeed, other-regarding 
concern in the form of the good of friendship and virtues such as justice and generosity 
are constitutive parts of human flourishing. 
 Human flourishing is self-directed. Self-direction is the exercise of rational 
agency. Human flourishing requires knowledge of its constituent goods and virtues and 
the practical wisdom necessary to choose the proper course of action in a given context. 
This depends on the individual agent to initiate and sustain over the course of his life the 
exercise of his rational capacities in order to achieve the intellectual insights and traits of 
character and to make the correct choices and the right actions that are necessary for his 
flourishing. This no one can do for him, for although the conclusions of thought “can be 
shared, the act of reasoning that is the exercise of self-direction cannot.”171 Self-direction 
is thus “the central necessary constituent or ingredient of human flourishing. It is that 
feature of human flourishing without which no other feature could be a constituent.”172 
 Human flourishing is profoundly social. Rasmussen and Den Uyl identify four 
ways in which human beings are naturally social animals: 1) “Our maturation or 
flourishing requires a life with others.” 2) “[H]aving other-concern is crucial to our 
maturation.” 3) “Our origins are almost always social.” 4) And here Aristotelian liberals 
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go beyond Aristotle: “Human sociality can, if need be, extend beyond the polis and be 
cosmopolitan....human sociality is open-ended.”173 This fourth point is particularly 
important because it marks a major difference between Aristotelian liberals and Aristotle, 
and, to an even greater extent, between Aristotelian liberals and communitarians. An 
Aristotelian liberal will recognize not only that in order to flourish one can only do so “in 
some community or other,” but also that “this does not mean that a given community's 
values will always be appropriate for an individual. Thus, one is not morally required 
simply to accept – indeed, one might be required to reject – the status quo. In such 
circumstances, one might need to [attempt to] refashion a community's values [by 
example and persuasion] or find a new community.”174 Rasmussen and Den Uyl argue 
that “the open-ended character of human sociality discloses the need for a perspective 
that is wide-ranging enough to explain how the possible relationships among persons who 
as yet share no common values and are strangers to each other can, nonetheless, be 
ethically compossible.”175 In this vein, one may look upon humanity as a whole insofar as 
its members do not engage in fundamentally anti-social behavior (i.e., the threat or use of 
initiatory physical force) as comprising a cosmopolis or Great Society within which are 
an uncountable number of different kinds and levels of overlapping communities: some 
of which we will belong to for life, some we will join, some we will leave, and all of 
which we will affect in often unintended ways to some degree with our dreams, choices, 
and actions. 
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 Practical wisdom plays a central integrating role in human flourishing not only 
because there are many goods and virtues that constitute it and not only because there is 
no a priori weighting, ranking, or balancing of these goods and virtues but also because 
each person's flourishing is unique – given their unique talents, social context, interests, 
choices, and so forth. 
It is fundamentally erroneous to assume that abstract ethical principles 
alone can determine the proper course of conduct for any particular 
individual. Such ethical rationalism fails to grasp that ethics is practical 
and concerned with particular and contingent facts – facts that abstract 
ethical principles cannot explicitly capture. Such facts are crucial to 
determining what ought to be done. Thus, contrary to much modern and  
contemporary ethics, not all morally proper conduct need be something 
everybody should do.176  
 
It might be thought, however, that this account of human flourishing is vitiated by serious 
underdetermination and irresolvable conflicts between the goods that constitute it. 
Rasmussen and Den Uyl point out in anticipatory reply that underdetermination  
is a flaw only if one assumes that the aim of moral theory is to dictate a set 
of specific and equally suited rules of conduct for every person regardless 
of his or her nexus.177 But this is not necessary given that the human good 
is neither abstract nor agent-neutral. Practical wisdom deals with the 
contingent and the particular and can provide guidance regarding 
substantial matters, if we do not confuse it with theoretical reason or its 
features.178 
 
Quite the contrary to being a flaw, this 'underdetermination' is actually a significant 
advantage “because it represents a theoretical openness to diversity.”179 
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 Furthermore, not only does much of modern and contemporary ethics confuse 
agent-neutrality with objectivity but it also neglects the importance of the individual and 
practical wisdom to morality and flourishing and forgets that by its nature ethics is open-
ended. It is thus no accident that so much of modern and contemporary ethical theory 
confuses ethics with law. “Law must be concerned with rules that are universal and 
necessary, because it is concerned with the question of establishing social conditions that 
must apply to everyone equally. Ethics, on the other hand, need not be so construed. 
Ethical principles need to be open to the particular and contingent circumstances of the 
lives of different individuals.”180 
 Rasmussen and Den Uyl also have an anticipatory reply for the alleged problem 
of irresolvable conflict between a significant plurality of goods: “A plurality of inherent 
goods does not necessarily make them incompatible, if we do not confuse concrete with 
abstract considerations and if we recognize that it is by using practical wisdom, not rules, 
that potential conflicts are reconciled.”181 Considered abstractly, there is no logical 
incompatibility between the various goods of which flourishing is partly constituted. 
“Concretely considered, keeping them from becoming incompatible by discovering their 
proper weighting or balancing is an individual's central task. Yet, this is only an 
insuperable difficulty if we assume that the goods and virtues that compose human 
flourishing are equal among themselves and identical across individuals.”182 
 “We need abstract [theoretical] knowledge of generic goods and virtues as well as 
practical wisdom's insight into the contingent and the particular” in order to live an 
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ethical and hence a flourishing life.183 The generic goods and virtues serve to delimit 
what counts as flourishing, but within this range what counts as a particular good or 
virtue for a given individual will depend not only upon his universal human nature but 
also on objective and particular value-laden facts about him such as his talents, his 
historical/social context, his personal choices, and the specific circumstances he finds 
himself in at the moment of action. “[P]ractical reason properly used, which is the virtue 
of practical wisdom, is the intelligent management of one's life so that all the necessary 
goods and virtues are coherently achieved, maintained, and enjoyed in a manner that is 
appropriate for the individual human being.”184 The individual's task is not merely one of 
conflict avoidance, however, but also of integration: One must make the goods and 
virtues one's own, so to speak, “by an act of reason or insight, not by mere mechanical 
application of universal principles to concrete cases. It is not just that an individualistic 
perfectionism points to a wider variety of 'relevant differences' among agents....It is 
rather that agenthood itself is the 'relevant difference'.”185 
 We are now, finally, in a better position to examine with greater precision the 
Aristotelian-liberal theory of autonomy. It is well to begin with the political dimension of 
autonomy (liberty) for several reasons. First, political autonomy or liberty is traditionally 
the central concept in liberal political theory. Second, liberals, with the exception of the 
modern social democrat variety, rarely venture beyond it toward recognition of what I 
call social and personal autonomy, at least not as important aspects of political theory. 
And third, of the three fundamental dimensions of local individual autonomy, political 
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autonomy is the clearest and most straightforward and the best understood (at least by 
classical liberals and libertarians). Political autonomy as I have defined it consists of 
being free from physical coercion. Although certain kinds of people are never at a loss for 
seeming justifications (new and old) for the violating of political autonomy, it is arguably 
almost universally and commonsensically understood that the act of coercing someone 
with the threat or use of physical force – such as by violence, murder, fraud and naked 
theft – imposes the aggressor's desires, interests, preferences, choices, actions, etc., on the 
victim without his consent. To the extent that this occurs the victim exists not for his own 
sake but for another's: his desires, interests, preferences, choices, actions, etc., are no 
longer truly his but are alien to him.  
 In her essay, “Aristotle's Function Argument: A Defense,” Jennifer Whiting 
makes an apropos analogy to a malfunctioning heart controlled by a pacemaker: 
A heart which, owing to some deficiency in its natural capacities, cannot 
beat on its own but is made to beat by means of a pacemaker is not a 
healthy heart. For it, the heart, is not strictly performing its function. 
Similarly, a man who, owing to some deficiency in his natural capacities, 
cannot manage his own life but is managed by means of another's 
deliberating and ordering him is not eudaimōn – not even if he possesses 
the same goods and engages in the same first order activities as does a 
eudaimōn man. For he, the man, is not strictly speaking performing his 
function....Aristotle's claim that eudaimonia is an activity of the soul in 
accordance with virtue shows that he thinks that eudaimonia consists in 
exercising rational agency.186 
 
Similarly, an otherwise normally functioning human being who is physically coerced is  
to that extent strictly speaking not performing his function; indeed, so much the worse 
compared to Whiting's example because he is otherwise healthy! 
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 Drawing on the foregoing analysis of human flourishing, it is possible to clarify 
the nature and importance of political autonomy yet further. On the most fundamental 
level it is self-direction, or global individual autonomy, that is compromised by the threat 
or use of physical force. So both global autonomy and local political autonomy are 
compromised by the threat or use of physical force. As we have seen, self-direction is a 
necessary and the central condition and constitutive element of flourishing. Whatever a 
desire, an interest, a preference, a choice, an action, an entire life that is directed by 
another may be called it is not good, virtuous, or flourishing. Thus, if our goal is for 
persons to flourish then we must respect their political autonomy and refrain from 
initiating the threat or use of physical force against them. Now, since we too wish to live 
a flourishing life, and since we are not gods but men, it will not do to be a pacifist. We 
must rather take those actions, consonant with virtue, that are necessary for protecting our 
own political autonomy. Rasmussen and Den Uyl have argued that it follows from this 
that the basic, negative, natural right to liberty (or political autonomy) is the organizing 
principle of society necessary for protecting the possibility of self-direction and thus of 
all forms of human flourishing. The right to liberty proscribes the threat or use of 
initiatory physical force. The right to liberty, since it protects the possibility of self-
direction, which is the central and fundamental feature common to all forms of human 
flourishing, does not bias the structure of the political/legal order in favor of any form of 
human flourishing. Rather, it secures the central, but not the only, necessary condition 
that makes human flourishing in all its forms possible. For this reason, Rasmussen and 
Den Uyl call the right to liberty a metanormative principle.187 
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 While I think this argument is correct and certainly important, from the point of 
view of virtue ethics this point that the right to liberty is a metanormative principle is not 
the whole story or even the most important part, and certainly not the most fundamental 
part. David Gordon points out one deficiency of a primarily demand-side defense of 
rights, like that of Rasmussen and Den Uyl seems to be: “[I]t does not follow from the 
fact that others must respect your rights, if you are to flourish, that you have an obligation 
to respect their rights. You may well have such an obligation, but more than an appeal to 
the conditions of your own flourishing is needed to show this.”188 Arguing that the right 
to liberty is necessary for protecting the possibility of everyone's flourishing goes some 
distance in shoring up this deficiency, but it still seems too consequentialist, not quite 
Aristotelian enough. Since Rasmussen and Den Uyl argue that rights-respecting behavior 
does not directly contribute to human flourishing, respecting the rights of others seems to 
be of instrumental value only.189 Why should I not violate your liberty for my own 
benefit, or the benefit of others, if I think I have a reasonable chance of getting away with 
it (with or without doing irreparable harm to societal order)? To answer this, we need an 
account of rights as interpersonal ethical principles the respecting of which is constitutive 
of all forms of flourishing worthy of the name. 
 The Rasmussen and Den Uyl account of rights as metanormative principles 
operates at the structural level of analysis, the level of political and legal theory. From the 
personal level of analysis, the level of ethical theory, we can draw on a supply side-
demand side distinction to arrive at the realization that rights do not derive primarily from 
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facts about the rights-bearer qua moral patient but rather derive primarily from facts 
about the moral agent. Like the virtue ethics of Aristotle, Aristotelian-liberal virtue ethics 
focuses on the moral agent; it offers a supply-side approach rather than a typically 
modern demand-side approach to morality and rights. As Roderick Long explains: 
“According to a demand-side ethics, the way that A should treat B is determined 
primarily by facts about B, the patient of moral activity; but for a supply-side approach 
like Virtue Ethics, the way that A should treat B is determined primarily by facts about A, 
the agent of moral activity.”190 The central question of a eudaimonistic virtue ethics is not 
“What consequences should I promote?” or “What rules should I follow?” but rather 
“What kind of person should I be?” In other words, it is not that rights are first properties 
of individuals and thereby produce obligations in others. On the contrary, it is rather our 
prior obligations as human beings to live a life of reason from which rights are derived. 
As Long argues,  
just as courage, generosity, and temperance are the virtues that define the 
appropriately human attitudes toward danger, giving, and bodily pleasures 
respectively, so the virtue of justice defines the appropriately human 
attitude toward violence. A maximally human life will give central place 
to the distinctively human faculty of reason; and one's life more fully 
expresses this faculty to the extent that one deals with others through 
reason and persuasion, rather than through violence and force. To choose 
cooperation over violence is to choose a human mode of existence over a 
bestial one. Hence the virtuous person will refrain from initiating coercion 
against others.191 
 
 There are more subtle forms of coercion than the threat or use of physical force. 
There are also myriad other factors that can contribute to the loss of autonomy in its 
social and personal dimensions. Under all but the most extreme circumstances, however, 
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a normally functioning human being possessing political autonomy has his capacity for 
self-directedness intact. This is not to say that he will always make good use of his 
rational faculty, but there is an important difference between being self-directed on the 
one hand and being practically wise and living a flourishing life on the other. Herein lies 
another difference that distinguishes political autonomy from social and personal 
autonomy. Social and personal autonomy are nevertheless important constitutive 
elements of a flourishing life, however. 
 To reiterate the definitions of social and personal autonomy given previously: I 
define social autonomy as freedom from social influences other than the threat or use of 
physical force that lead a person to deviate from his telos.192 There are any number of 
social influences that can lead a person astray from the life appropriate for him. Some 
social influences are more pervasive and powerful than others. Some such influences are 
in and of themselves malignant, but others are for the most part neutral or benign.  
Among the more malignant are certain sorts of behaviors and institutions that discourage 
or actively seek to suppress rationality, individuality, self-responsibility, productivity, 
and other virtues. Cultures that encourage unquestioning obedience to authority and 
subordination of the individual to the collective are prime examples. Other problematic 
cultural institutions are paternalism, racism, and sexism. Many social influences are not 
malignant in and of themselves, however; they can serve to distract but they also offer 
themselves up as opportunities to discover our true telos. It is the task of the individual to 
develop practical wisdom and employ it to make the correct choices for himself. 
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 Personal autonomy is internal freedom from deviant desires, severe addiction to 
drugs, and so forth that lead a person to deviate from his telos. That deviant desires are 
not autonomous is clear from what has already been said. They stand opposed to reason, 
to one's eudaimonia. They undermine one's autonomy in the aggregate. They are a part of 
who we are presently but alien to our telos. It also seems clear that being physically 
addicted to some substance undermines one's autonomy. Addiction puts one's desires in 
opposition to reason, but it does not necessarily compromise self-direction. It does, 
however, undermine how well one uses one's self-direction. On the other hand, an 
extremely severe addiction to a powerful drug might well be enough to compromise self-
direction. 
 While it is important to distinguish political, social and personal autonomy 
conceptually, it is also important to recognize their deep interrelations. To the extent that 
political autonomy is violated social and personal autonomy are rendered impossible, for 
violations of political autonomy not only impose alien desires, etc., on the victim. They 
also compromise self-direction, which is a constitutive part of all three dimensions of 
local autonomy. Social heteronomy can promote personal heteronomy, and vice versa. 
Similarly, personal and social heteronomy can encourage violations of political 
autonomy. For example, a teenager could mistakenly seek fulfillment by joining a street 
gang and, in order to fit in, get hooked on drugs and then commit violent crimes in 
support of his gang and his habit. For a generational example, a verbally abusive 
relationship with one's father can be a contributing factor (although not an excuse!) in the 
son growing up to become an alcoholic who then visits the same abuse he suffered on his 
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own son. Personal heteronomy could easily lead to the verbal abuse becoming physical as 
well. 
 I will grant that in extreme cases of social and/or personal heteronomy in which 
self-direction may be compromised, that it might be the necessary and right thing to do to 
forcefully but temporarily intervene in order to restore the heteronomous person's 
capacity for self-direction. Because these are exceptional cases, involving highly complex 
issues, the proper course of action cannot be generalized or universalized into law. It is a 
personal moral decision not to be taken lightly – one that depends on the capabilities and 
other obligations of the one making the decision, on the likelihood of immediate and 
long-term success, and myriad other factors; and one that requires intimate knowledge of 
the heteronomous person in question, including whether the person would endorse the 
intervention after being restored to self-direction and some measure of local autonomy.  
Such a decision is not one that can be freely sanctioned by the law. There must be a 
presumption in favor of liberty in the legal system and the law must be restricted to 
protecting individual liberty, as a requirement of justice and in order to protect the 
possibility of self-direction. Should the concerned party choose to intervene, he must be 
prepared to pay the legal consequences if the one he intended to help ultimately rejects 
his efforts and chooses to press charges.193 The paradigm case I have in mind here is that 
of a close friend or relative who becomes severely addicted to drugs, such as crystal 
meth. Up to a point it might be the necessary and right thing to do for that person's family 
and close friends to stage an intervention in an attempt to restore his or her capacity for 
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self-direction and some measure of local autonomy, in order to give the drug addict a 
chance to reconsider his life and past actions.194 In such a case I would say that the drug 
addict's right to liberty/political autonomy has not necessarily been violated, if there was 
good reason to believe that the intervention was something he or she would want and if, 
freed from the immediate grip of the drug, he or she actually endorses the intervention. In 
other words, the intervener(s) must have good reason to believe that the intervention is 
something that the heteronomous person would consent to and then hope that this 
supposition proves to be accurate. 
 To avoid possible misunderstanding, it is important to clarify what the argument 
of the previous paragraph does not mean or imply. I do not think that there is an inherent 
conflict between virtue and rights or between morality and the law. The actual demands 
of virtue and rights, of morality and the law (insofar as it is just), do not conflict. 
Ultimately, rights are ethical principles derived from the virtue of justice. On the other 
hand, there certainly can be apparent conflicts between virtue and rights, morality and the 
law. These can arise because of errors made by the involved parties – the principals, 
witnesses, lawyers, and judge(s) – whether because of bias, a deficiency in practical 
wisdom, a mistaken notion of the good and the right, a badly formed or applied law, a 
lack of all the relevant information, etc. If the law and the legal system are to be just and 
the possibility of self-direction protected, there must be a presumption in favor of liberty. 
It thus may happen that particular legal decisions will sometimes run counter to what 
virtue and rights actually demand in those cases. 
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 There can be no conflict between the actual demands of justice and rights; and 
there is no conflict between morality and just laws. However, ethics and law have 
different natures and functions. Ethics is open-ended and must deal with the contingent 
and the particular in the lives of individuals; its demands are 'relative to us'. Law must be 
universal, applying to all equally, because it has the function of maintaining a 
political/legal order that is not biased in favor of any form of human flourishing by 
protecting the possibility of self-direction, the central and most fundamental necessary 
feature of all forms of human flourishing. Rights qua metanormative principles are the 
standard by which we judge whether the laws and legal system are just. In order to fulfill 
their function, the laws and legal system must have a presumption in favor of liberty and 
this will sometimes lead to a gap between particular legal decisions and the actual 
demands of virtue and rights qua interpersonal ethical principles. 
 Along the lines of distinguishing between ethics and the law, a few brief remarks 
can be made here about the notion of 'law as educative'. It certainly is, but this is not its 
primary function and its educative power is far more limited and indirect than Aristotle 
and many others have supposed. First, there is no necessary connection between the law 
and the promotion of ethical virtue. Second, correct behavior or orderly conduct is only 
one component of ethical virtue or moral excellence, and it is only the former that the law 
can promote directly.195 Third, there is an important difference between legislative laws, 
those mountains of arbitrary and vague laws invented by statesmen in a generally corrupt 
monocentric system on the one hand and polycentric customary law, which can result 
from competitive institutions through a process of natural social evolution, on the 
                                                 
195 On these points, see Rasmussen and Den Uyl (2005), pp. 94-95. 
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other.196 Finally, any law or public policy that goes beyond the protection of the right to 
liberty is contrary to the demands of justice and the nature of law, and biases the 
political/legal order in favor of some forms of human flourishing over others. 
 Clearly on the Aristotelian-liberal theory of autonomy sketched above there are 
epistemic difficulties inherent in evaluating the autonomy of particular persons, 
particularly for social and personal autonomy but even for political autonomy. We 
sometimes or often in the case of political autonomy, and usually in the case of social and 
personal autonomy, do not have all of the relevant information about a person, persons, 
or situation. Such epistemic difficulties are not unique to the Aristotelian-liberal theory of 
autonomy. Indeed, they are a natural part of life. The epistemic difficulties of evaluating 
particular cases of autonomy or heteronomy can only be mitigated, as social and personal 
autonomy can only be promoted, through effective teaching, habituation, and experience 
– i.e., through the development of practical wisdom and ethical virtue. It is important to 
reiterate that social and personal autonomy cannot be promoted at the systematic expense 
of political autonomy, for political autonomy is necessary for the very possibility of 
social and personal autonomy. Moreover, the threat or use of initiatory physical force is 





                                                 




 Autonomy is a concept that has played an important role in Kantian moral 
philosophy, moral and analytic philosophy, the political philosophy of liberalism, and the 
liberal/communitarian debate. There are many dimensions of autonomy, however, and 
scholars have often not been clear which dimension they were utilizing. One task of this 
essay has been to distinguish clearly the different dimensions of autonomy. The 
taxonomy of autonomy delineated in chapter three should help to resolve theoretical 
confusions in the aforementioned traditions. Chief among these are the mistaken 
grounding of moral agency and moral responsibility in local autonomy rather than global 
autonomy; the failure to recognize the importance of all three dimensions of local 
autonomy – political, social, and personal – to human flourishing, particularly in the case 
of communitarians, left-liberal social democrats, and others; and, in the case of classical 
liberals and libertarians, a frequent but mistaken exclusion of social and personal 
autonomy from an important place in their political philosophy. 
 The main purpose of this essay has been to develop an Aristotelian-liberal theory 
of autonomy employing the taxonomy of autonomy delineated in chapter three as an 
alternative not only to the Kantian and major analytic theories of autonomy but also to 
the strictly Aristotelian theory of autonomy. Thus, chapter one set the stage by discussing  
the Kantian theory of autonomy and the major theories in the analytic tradition of 
philosophy. The Kantian theory was found wanting from the Aristotelian and 
Aristotelian-liberal point of view. The analytic theories were frequently found wanting by 
the standards of their own tradition because of inherent difficulties from which arise the 
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Problem of Manipulation, the Regress-cum-Incompleteness Problem, and the Ab Initio 
Problem/Problem of Authority. From the Aristotelian and Aristotelian-liberal point of 
view, the analytic theories also suffer from a misguided and unnecessary striving to be 
morally content-neutral as well as a problematic grounding of autonomy in hierarchies of 
desire rather than in the exercise of reason and teleological eudaimonism. 
 The Aristotelian-liberal theory of autonomy itself avoids the three Problems that 
plague the analytic theories. The Problem of Manipulation is avoided with the 
clarification of the nature of self-direction and the political and social dimensions of local 
individual autonomy. Any kind of Dworkinian ex cathedra claim is also avoided by the 
grounding of self-direction and (local) autonomy in an understanding of human nature, 
including human teleology, eudaimonia and virtue. The Regress-cum-Incompleteness 
Problem is avoided because the question of a regress never arises in this theory, owing to 
the fact that autonomy consists in self-direction and human flourishing. The theory 
avoids the Ab Initio Problem/Problem of Authority by explaining self-direction and the 
development of local autonomy as well as the authority that reason and one's eudaimonia 
have for oneself. 
 Aristotle, although a precursor to modern liberalism, was not himself a liberal. He 
did not fully appreciate the individualized nature of human flourishing, and the nature 
and importance of individual liberty. He wrongly attributed to nature rather than cultural 
factors and mere prejudice on his part the alleged rational deficiency of women compared 
to that of men and of non-Greeks compared to Greeks. And his conflation of state and 
civil society, while perhaps unavoidable in his era, is no longer tenable; in light of liberal 
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theory and modern experiences the state as such, regardless of its constitution or the 
virtue of the rulers, must be seen as problematic. Nevertheless, a broadly and somewhat 
modernized Aristotelian philosophy provides a better foundation for liberalism, allowing 
it to avoid pitfalls common to Enlightenment philosophies and their contemporary 
successors. Moreover, Aristotelian liberalism, and an Aristotelian-liberal theory of 
autonomy, promise to transcend the liberal/communitarian debate. The charge of having 
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